A Study On The Difficulties In Coface Negotiation In Rural Environmental Pollution

Along with the process of rapid industrialization and urbanization, rural environmental pollution and its derivative problem get increasingly serious. The persistent and accumulative pollution not only causes such problems as economic loss, right violation, and health threat, but also queries about the scientific rationality of economics’ methods, logic and policy suggestions. Based on combing the related literatures, it found that the western mainstream economics not only took environmental pollution problem as non-system problem of exogenous market system, but also lacked the study on the endogenous environment pollution. The literature lay in deficiency of “paying more attention to appearance but losing the exploration on nature” when researchers do the job of theory study, and the defects of “not curing the disease but the symptoms” when the researchers seek to solve problems.Faced with the fierce contrast between theory and practice, the paper stuck to the standpoint of historical materialism and used the positive methods of seeking truth from facts, agreed that the scientific idea of theory’s frontier lies in practice, and adhered to the founded thinking of “based on practice, holding on key points, and solving problems”, so as to explore the inner mechanism of rural environmental pollution and the integral framework of solving rural environmental pollution.Firstly, on the aspects of methodology and theory foundation, and based on the methodology of practice and the analysis foundation of the behavioral agents’ heterogeneity, the paper explored the inner mechanism of China’s rural environmental pollution.(1) Through discussing the shortcomings of the mainstream economic positive methods, it found that most of literatures had the flaws including selective hypothesis, logical fallacies and fragmentation research. The special method did not conform to the spirit of “seeking truth from facts”, and could misdirect practice.(2) Based on practicing and solving problems, the paper acknowledged and stuck to the fundamental reality of behavioral agents’ heterogeneity from the economic society, which broke through the traditional assumption of western mainstream economics: behavioral agent homogeneity. The paper also found that Coase negotiation on the property rights and transaction could not take place efficiently and equally in China’s rural districts. Because the heterogeneity among behavioral agents lies in the disparity and its accumulations on such aspects as income, property, rights and power, the trend would impact the research paradigm of western mainstream economics.(3) Just because of the heterogeneity of behavioral agents, one the one hand, the negotiation or transaction between the stronger and weaker coming from its inner or outer group would result in the systematic externalities in the processes of income distribution and cost undertaking. The situation enlarged the gaps between the different behavioral agents. However, on the other hand, when the weaker take the reasonable choices between interest and morality, they might choose moral hazards only on the pressure of enhancing income level and of disparity. Just for farmers, they themselves seek to pollute and even destroy rural environment.(4) On the ground of urban and rural duality structure, the asymmetry on negotiation structure and exchange mechanism inspires industry and cities to misuse rural resources and environment and to take the places of the increasing and much expensive urban resources and environment, which could heavily aggravate the problems of rural environmental pollution.Secondly, on the research of China’s practice, strictly based on the situations of urban and rural duality structure, rural land property rights segmentation, and national fiscal decentralization, the paper explored the formation mechanism of rural environmental pollution. On the one hand, as the vulnerable groups, rural districts and farmers could be the agents who pollute rural environment under the pressure of reducing cost and enhancing their revenue. On the other hand, as the stronger groups, cities and industry tend to transfer their pollution to rural districts on the judgment of economic interest and comparative advantage, and the system of “public choices” which is bias to the stronger group supports the social cost transfer in an unjust way.Once again, on the summarizing successful experience and learning from foreign experience and lessons, on the one hand, it chose the case about collectivization operation of China’s natural scenic area, and explored the centralization of rural land property rights and enhancing property rights agents’ abilities of negotiation and exchange, which would help to improve the equality in the field of negotiation ability between Coase negotiation agents. On the other hand, the paper chose the foreign case, that is, Japan’s environmental pollution and its control, and studied Japan’s government performance on environmental pollution abatement and its limitation. Just those jobs mentioned above could be the inspiration and reference for us for seeking for the way of solving China’s rural environmental pollution problem.Lastly, on the measures and suggestions, the paper explored the integrity frame on solving China’s problem. Just from institution construction to policy choice, from the coordination and match of governmental fiscal rights and obligations to the regulations on firm, and to the building up of multiple level supervision and control system on rural environmental protection, the paper suggested that people should construct the incentive and restriction mechanism from market to government and from farmer to firm to moralize and legalize behavior agents. Especially, the emphasis is that only all of the above measures boosted completely and simultaneously, rural environmental pollution problem could be efficiently solved.