| Based on the classification of meta-ethics; primary problems of the meta-ethics, the topic for the research is to discuss the dual ethical method of Stevenson's Emotivism, especially, its features and important roles in transition in west modern ethics.I. The classificationsThere are several kinds of classifications for meta-ethics because of its complex schools, multifarious theory, with them sometimes in opposing or sometimes in blending. The research involves the following classifications: the first one, also the primary one, meta-ethics experiences from intuitionism to emotivism, to prescribism; the second one, naturalism, according to it, meta-ethics is divided into naturalism and unnaturalism; the third one, cognitivism and noncognitivism.As a result, so-called meta-ethics rebelling traditional ethics shows from the two points: one is from naturalism, which refers to meta-ethics' redefinition of ethical conception, such as "good", "justice" against traditional definition, which defined "good" as a kind of natural or supernatural property, such as happiness, pleasure, etc; another one is from cognitivism, which is about how ethical knowledge comes form, ethical judgments' property and function.II. Three primary problems of meta-ethics is to solve:There is respective problem for each stage of the three stages: the first stage, lasting first 20 years of 20th, mainly to solve the first problem of meta-ethics, ethical conception's definition, such as "good", with the unaturalism against naturalism in theory, the most typical theory is the "naturalism fallacy" supported by Moore; the second stage, lasting from 30's to 50's, mainly to the second problem of meta-ethics, ethical judgments' function, for example, imperative and persuasive functions, with noncognitivism against cognitivism in theory, and Stevenson's dual ethics system is considered as the most typical theory.III Stevenson's ethical theory of Emotivism as well as lies in the multi-transitions in meta-ethics:Stevenson's dual ethic methods plays a great important role in the history of west ethics as a result of its multi-transition: to meta-ethics, it transfers from monism to dualism; from concept analysis to emotive meaning and function; from logic analysis to psyche; from meaning to pragmatics; from empiricism to pragmatism. As to emotivism, it does from extreme to mild; from hawkish to moderate; from imperfect to perfect. Stevenson achieved by the dual ethic method, contained in his dual ethics system, which concerns philosophy, psychology, sociology, ethics, science, etc, with the features of completeness, careful expound and proving, logicality.Chapter II analyzes the several couples of dual elements of Stevenson's dual ethic system and display its machine-processed. Stevenson's duality comes from Hume's theory, which argues that reason and affection stay at their own posts in human's ethical judgments, with affection driving us and working as our moral norms. The duality of Stevenson's theory refers to reason and affection by Hume, which becomes two threads in his ethic method with activeness. Consequently, his theory develops according to two laws, natural and psychological, according to which, we can find that scientific world moves only in logic law, but our human beings are subjected to double laws of natural and psychological. Stevenson's theory started with the ethic disagreement between two thoughts in our social life, and ended with eliminating disagreement. The duality differentiates as disagreement in belief, which is used to record things and judged as true or false; as disagreement in attitudes, which shows our human's psyche inclination, such as affection, expressed as agreeing or disagreeing. Belief and attitude influence each other as reciprocal causation.Stevenson sees beliefs and attitudes as the core problem of ethics, because he thinks ethics' aim was to change others' attitudes but not tell true or false, moreover, attitude was always based on belief. Belief and attitude are expressed in language, as a consequence, the duality is shown as language's descriptive and emotive meaning; descriptive and dynamicfunctions; furthermore, as ethic judgments' has its dual properties as factual and emotive, which determines that ethic argumentation lies on dual basis of logic and psyche, which decides further the argumentation methods must be dual as rationalism and nonrationalism, so that Stevenson denied both traditional rationalism and modern irrationalism.Stevenson emphasizes that the relation between meta-ethic and norm ethic is like that between scientific method and specific science, so meta-ethics is only a kind method, and it that it must be neutral, indirect, nonnormal to human's action.. Semantic analysis of ethic terms is the means to Stevenson's ethics, but to find a method is his ethics' aim. By distinguishing the different meanings, functions, property, argumental laws and methods between ethic judgments' and scientific ones, he tells the difference between ethics and science.Chapter III is to discuss Stevenson's definition of "good", which is the first problem of meta-ethics. Stevenson claims that his theory would reach the two purposes: the first one is semantic clearing of some primary ethic terms, first, by which he criticizes the traditional naturalism's definition method which defines "good" as some natural emotion such as happiness, pleasure etc, or supernatural entity such as the God, spirit etc, on this point, Stevenson agrees with Moore, so that they belong to unnaturalism; furthermore, he too criticizes the unnatrualist Moore's some concept of intuition, unnatural property of "good", from which we can realize that Moore ceases moving at the level of what the "good" refers to. So, the definition of ethic terms, meta-ethics experienced three stages: from Moore's what "good" refers to, to Ayer's what "good" can tell us, to Stevenson's what "good" can tell us to choose, with subjective initiative being infused into the process of choosing by Stevenson. The subjective initiative lays a basis for naturalism's returning, known as the new naturalism. So we can say, by criticizing the points of traditional naturalism and some of Moore's unnaturalism, Stevenson finished the contending between unnaturalism and naturalism of meta-ethics.Chapter IV mainly discusses Stevenson's noncognitivism thought. We know the background of emotivism is the logic positivism. Though almost positivists rejects metaphysics, with which the ethics' entity is alsorejected as ethic term "good" is like the religion's "the god", but there are two parts about whether ethic knowledge is cognitive or noncognitive: the first part is called cognitivism, another part is called noncognitivism, to which emotivism belongs. Positivist Ayer is the first one to support noncognitivism, who concludes that ethic terms and judgment has two kinds functions, expressing emotion and arousing the same emotion. As a result, ethics is noncognitive. Stevenson amends Ayer's emotion's theory from the two sides, one is stress the secondary roles of beliefs and the ethic terms', another one is to extend the function from Ayer's arousing the others' emotion to persuading them to varying their attitudes, whose mechanics is the dual elements interplaying. With the ethic method, we can reach the aim of making others change their attitudes, disagreeing so as to agree with each other. Stevenson's noncoginitivism thoughts are attitude theories, nonrational method, etc, among which the most important and typical one is the persuasive definition.Chapter V mainly discusses Stevenson's ethic arguments method. He is against the analysis for the sake of analyzing, but for evaluation, moreover, and the aim is to argue his own opinions and persuade others to agree with the speaker, even to excite him or them to take action. Stevenson's arguments is, in fact, to show how we can transit from "be" to "should", and he regards "effectiveness" as the bridge between them. So Stevenson further tells the difference between ethics and science, ethics' arguments are argued according to their effectiveness, but science's are to their truthfulness.Chapter VI shows an example of displaying the relationship between meta-ethics and practice and applied ethic, with using Stevenson's dual ethical method showing how Marx building his ethics system without determining any action norms and ethic conception's definition such as "good" , "right" etc in Marx's theory of "surplus value" .
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