Syngman Rhee And The Washington-Seoul Alliance

As one of the mainstays of American Asian-Pacific alliance system, the Korean-American ally played a duel-role of containment of Soviet and China. The Syngman Rhee administration laid the foundation of the alliance which functioned as containment of communism and as regulation of allies. Most existing studies focus on the rivalry for the Peninsular among great powers and fail to cast a light on the internal alliance. By glimpsing inwardly, researchers will find it quite interesting how the US viewed, evaluated and responded to Rhee's conducts. The American decision-makers' perception of Rhee regime and the ensuing various orientations in decision-making process deserve more academic concern.This dissertation refers to the relevant monographs and articles and bases its arguments on the declassified archives from National Security Council, CIA files, Department files on Korean internal affairs and Foreign Relations of United States, etc. International relations theories are expected to be fused into historical narrative to demonstrate the impact of Rhee's domestic and foreign actions on the Department, which resulted in a duel-perception of asset and liability of Rhee regime. This perception, together with Washington's double aims — national security interests and ideological rivalry between the two camps — contribute to the American decision-making dilemma between containing communism externally and regulating allies internally during the Cold War. What's more, this case exemplifies the structure and nature of the Cold War through regional affairs.The dissertation is composed of three parts. The introduction reviews the studies nowdays on the US-Korea relations during the Rhee period and puts forward research project on this subject. Correspondingly, the research questions discussed in the dissertation are summarized in the conclusion. The main body explains the research questions following the logic of America's selecting, bolstering and losing Rhee regime.The First Chapter examines the interaction between the Soviet-US global confrontation and bipolarized politics in the South on two levels — Department-USMG and USMG-South Korean politics. The Cold War in Korea caused the end of the Joint Commission negotiation and hence the US-USSR cooperation was replaced by adversarial intensions, policies and actions. Rhee came into power just because his strong pro-America and anti-communism attitudes satisfied the American strategy in the South.The Second Chapter combines the NSC/8 and its crystallizations to analyze the American policies toward ROK before the Korean War. It's the Department's hope to disengage from the Peninsular that rationalize its assistance policy to minimize the negative influence of withdrawal and regulation of Rhee's conducts to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet or China. Some oft-repeated words in this period, such as periphery, symbol and status quo, matter greatly in understanding American policy toward Rhee administration.The Third Chapter highlights the dissertation and mirrors US-Rhee's divergence on the 38° demarcation line and the Armistice, which embodies the contradiction of American global strategy with ROK's national interests. The affiliated role of ROK in the American war policy shifting from military engagement to limited war shows the inequality of the two partners. The constitutional crisis in 1952 and armistice negotiation with ROK in 1953 led Washington to form the duel-perception of asset and liability of Rhee, which fostered different policy priorities when handling him. The two cases reflected an American dilemma oscillating between containment and regulation.The Fourth Chapter unfolds US-Korea controversies and mediations on the Geneva Conference, NNSC, military redeployment and economic assistance policy. Those facts cemented Rhee as not only asset of anti-communism fortress in Western Pacific area but liability to the US global strategy and ideological competition. This period witnessed the undermining regulation policy of US toward Rhee regime and compromises to Rhee's misconducts which led to his final collapse.The Last Chapter retraces the downfall of Rhee who had lost its international and domestic legitimacy. The passivity of the Department in the April Revolution repeated the dilemma before. Reexaminations among the top officials in the Department triggered by the incident preluded JFK's policy changes toward Korea. The experiences of dealing with Syngman Rhee, Chang Myon and Park Chung-hee reveal that the US was trying to accommodate his policy to Korean social environment. With the Park regime being established, the Washington-Seoul alliance step into a new era.