A Study On Medieval Jewish Dogmatic Thought

The term "dogma" which is strictly defined by the Catholic Church as such has no place in the tradition of Judaism. Judaism is a national religion of the Israel people. Membership in this particular community does not depend on creedal affirmations of a formal character. Every Jew is born into God's covenant with the chosen people by a Jewish mother, not by his confession of a fixed body of belief. Rabbinic Judaism is a legal religion, and its main concern is to do God's commandments, not to speculate on the right beliefs. There is no fixation of Jewish beliefs in the Bible and the Talmud. Until its encounter with the Greek philosophy and influenced by its way of thinking, Judaism never lent itself to theological expositions.In Middle Ages, when the main body of the Jewish people lived under the rule of Islam, the spiritual life of Judaism was deeply influenced by Islamic theological thought, which was a second-hand Greek philosophy combined with Islamic religion. Nurtured in the Islamic culture and forced to combat various attacks within and without Rabbinic Judaism, Saadia Gaon was the first medieval Jewish philosopher to use philosophy to interpret Torah and clarify its basic beliefs. By his works and authority, Greek thinking gained a permanent place in Judaism after Saadia Gaon and religious rationalism set its foot henceforth. In view of religious rationalism, the community of Israel is not only a ethnic group all descended from the same forefathers, but a religious group based on the same faith, which is the prepositional truth taught by Torah. It is not all surprising that with the progressing of religious rationalism in Judaism, eventually some daring soul would break the ground and set a fixed form of articles of faith demanding every Israeli's full conviction. The son of Maimon of Spanish Jewry lacked neither intellectual creativity nor brave personality to fulfill this mission. In his early works Mishnah Torah, commenting on Sanhedrin's Perek Helek, Maimonides expounded on 13 "Principles of Torah" for anyone to confirm if he wanted to have a share in the world to come. These 13 principles are: 1. that God exists;2. that God is one;3. that God is incorporeal;4. that God is ontologically prior to the cosmos;5. that God alone may be worshipped;6. that prophecy occurs;7. that Mosaic prophecy is superior to all others;8. that the Torah was given from heaven;9. that the Torah will never change nor be exchanged;10. that God knows individuals;11. that the righteous will be rewarded and the evil punished;12. that the Messiah will come;13. that the dead will be resurrected.After giving each of this foundation a detailed explanation, Maimonides claimed that when a man believed in all these fundamental principles, and his faith was thus clarified, he was then part of the Israel community and one was obliged to love and pity him according to the laws set in Torah. But if a man doubted any of these principles, he has left the community of Israel, and was called sectarians. One was required to hate him and destroy him. This articulation of Jewish creed was the first of its kind in the history of Rabbinic Judaism. Contrary to its tradition, not only a Jew's membership in the Israel community, but his salvation in the afterworld is dependent on the affirmation of these 13 principles. Their dogmatic elements notwithstanding, certain questions need to be addressed. Just to mention a few: Firstly, why Maimonides never mentioned 13 principles in his later works, for example, in his great code Mishneh Torah and his philosophical work Guide for the Perplexed? Secondly, why didn't he include "free choice" and "creation" in his 13 principles, since he stressed these two mostly in his later works? Thirdly, when he wrote his Commentary he was an unknown young man, by what authority did he think he could set up a Jewish dogma for the whole people of Israel?To solve these problems properly, I suggest that one must distinguish two different questions. One, are 13 principles Jewish dogma by nature? Two, is it Maimonides' intention to expound Jewish dogma in his Commentary? To the first question the answer is yes; to the second, no. Just as Athur Hyman rightly points out that Maimonides' 13 principles are structured and restricted by the Mishnah text, and his status as a commentator does not allow him to give an independent opinion and to articulate a comprehensive list of Jewish beliefs. Does this mean that Maimonides intentionally sacrificed some articles of Jewish dogma just to fit into the Mishnah context? Of course not. The solemnity and seriousness of the nature of a religious dogma can hardly permit Maimonides such freedom. Hence, one must conclude that Maimonides did not intend a formal fixation of Jewish dogma in this circumstance. The 13 principles of Maimonides is not a product of a systematic study of the whole body of Jewish faith by him.By our former distinction, the dogmatic character of the 13 principles holds regardless of its author's intention. Still the question remains: why Jewish dogma? Why 13 principles at all? Some explain that because Maimonides lived in the Middle Ages when Islam and Christianity claimed that they had superceded its mother religion, Maimomides was somehow compelled to stress the superiority of some of the beliefs of Judaism. Others interpret from a political perspective that, as a philosopher, Maimonides never believes that by vocal repeating of these 13 principles, one could perfect his intellect and gain a share in the afterworld. These fixations of Jewish belief are only for the consumption of the mass and stability of the state, since a believer in God and his providence tends to be obedient to law and strict on his moral.By criticizing these and other former explanations, Menachem Kellner offered the latest one. He argues that Maimonides' aim is to strengthen his people's observing of Jewish law, because Maimonides believes that right deed is preconditioned by right belief. This is hardly so. Maimonides is a rationalist, and his very radicalism in this regard leads him to the conviction that there is a reason behind every piece of law, and Torah's aim is to teach the right opinion and belief. These convictions make every law only secondary to the opinion behind it and ladder to the higher intellectual perfection. My critique is that Keller's explanation runs counter to Maimonides' religious rationalism, which is the main thrust of all his legal and philosophical works, and could not stand. It is reasonable to contend that the dogmatic character of the 13 principles is an outgrowth of Maimonides' religious intellectualism. The first 5 principles, which define the philosophical understanding of the monotheistic God, are the ultimate goal by themselves. The last 8 principles are more practical and aim to encourage all Jews to observe the law, which in turn serve the ultimate goal of the first 5 principles.Maimonides' 13 principles were totally ignored by the Jewish academic circle in the next two hundred years. The topic of Jewish dogma only resurged in 15^th century as a major discussion under Christian church's proselytizing efforts. The church's strengthened effort to convert Jews yielded great success. It led many Jews forfeit their ancestors' religion and embrace the Christian faith. Under the pressure of Christian missionary duress, the religious leaders of Judaism were forced to defend its teachings, including clarifying the main principles of Jewish faith. Thus Maimonides' 13 principles re-entered the spotlight of the often heated and acrimonious dogmatic debate.Among the major medieval Jewish philosophers who took part in the discussion, 5 figures stood up. They are Duran, Crescas, and Albo in early 15^th century, and Bibago and Abravanel in the end.The main tendency of Jewish dogmatic thought in the early 15^th century is anti-Maimonidian. Duran, Crescas, and Albo all criticized Maimonides' formation of 13 principles. Crescas and Albo, especially, created their own dogmatic system to replace Maimonides'. Crescas listed 6 cornerstones (pinnot) of Torah, which are:1. God's knowledge of particulars;2. Providence; 3. God's power;4. Prophecy;5. Choice;6. Purposefulness of the Torah;Albo further deduced Jewish fundamentals to three: the existence of God, Torah from heaven, and reward and punishment. Kellner explains that, the disagreements between Maimonides and the philosophers in the early 15^th century arose primarily from their different definitions of the principles of Torah: Maimonides uses the term "principle" in a strict dogmatic sense, while Duran, Crescas, and Albo see Judaism as a certain kind of science and take the principles of Torah as the premises and axioms of this particular science. By analyzing the content of their dogmatic works, one could find that Kellner's explanation is hardly the case. All the Jewish philosophers in the early 15^th century, Duran, Crescas, and Albo, stressed that 'Torah from heaven" was the center of Jewish belief, and all the teachings and commandments are equal in their divinity. To return to the traditional view on Jewish faith is consistent with Duran, Crescas, and Albo's anti-Maimonidian stand, and also fit into the anti-Christian spirit in the Jewish intellectual circle, while Kellner's scientific explanation missed the point.At the end of 15^th century, the anti-Maimonidian tendency of the Jewish dogmatic thought changed dramatically. Bibago was such an admirer of Maimonides that he could not tolerate any opposition to his dogmatic formulation. Abravanel himself belonged to the anti-Maimonidian camp; nevertheless, he defended 13 principles even more thoroughly and effectively than Bibago. Strangely enough, at the end of his major dogmatic works, Rosh Amanah, which claimed to defend Maimonides' dogmatic formulation at the beginning, Abravanel emphasized that all the teachings and laws in Torah were equal, and Judaism had no principles at all. One may wonder, why does he contradict himself in such an obvious way? The reason lies in the fact that all the dogmatic thought at the end of the 15^th century was largely determined by the 1492 Spanish Expulsion. To defend Maimonides' dogmatic formulation as the Jewish dogma is a necessity by the historical crisis, and not a theoretical speculation by its own right.The dogmatic topic dropped entirely from the Jewish academic agenda as the Jewish people's Spanish era ended with the 1492 Expulsion. Yet the dogmatic movement in the medieval period had a lasting effect on Jewish thought and self-consciousness. As time passed, Maimonides' 13 principles had been well received by almost all Jewish communities and even found a place in the Jewish liturgy. Not only so, Judaism greatly enriched itself by going through this period of dogmatic formulation and debate. Since this Spanish era, Jewish people not only understand their ancestors' religion from a legal point of view, but from the perspective of religious beliefs. When the Jewish Liberation and Reform Movement began in 18^th century, the dogmatic issue reappeared in Judaism and sparkled new debate. The new discussion surely has its origins in and resources from medieval period.