| The theory of concept is one of the most hardcore which is discussed by contemporary cognitive science,cognitive psychology,philosophy of language and experimental linguistics. Currently, the classic hypothesis of cognitive science is that the mind of human being is information operating systems. If the processes of mind are operations on informational symbols, then there must be some basic structures of the informational symbols, then the concepts are recognized as normative carrier of information. That is, concepts are basic compositions of mind. So what are concepts? Are concept real entities in our brains or the tools we make up? Does concepts have structures? How we achieve concepts? Do we have concepts innate or acquired? How to decide the meaning of concepts? Such questions puzzle not only the philosophers and cognitive scientists historical but also up-to-date. My thesis attempt to review the basic environment of concept theory, which based on Jerry Fodor's viewpoint. We intent to exhibit the general situations of the concept theory through three main thesis, that is, the metaphysics of concept,concept acquisition and concept content.First I would like to introduce the basic principles of Fodor'RTM theory, which including five main thesis. First, psychology as intentional science; Second, mental representation as carriers of intentional content; Third, the computational model of mind; Forth, information semantics; And the last, the reconstructive Frege's semantics. These five propositions are the hardcore of Fodor's philosophy. Though he has changed some of his earlier ideas, but these five principles has never changed. To understand the RTM theory we can understand why he consider concepts as the most basic terms of cognitive science.Then I will discuss the main concept theories of contemporary cognitive science, that is, the definition theory,the prototype theory and the theory theories, and hold that the inferential role semantics is the philosophical foundations of all these empirical theories. Then I will discuss Fodor's critique of the prototype theory. Fodor hold that if languages are compositional then concepts can not be prototype. And then Fodor criticize the classic model of concept acquisition which hold by empiricists, that is the hypothesis - confirmation model, and point out the empiricist way is impasse.After the discussion of the criticism of the main concept theories, we will introduce Fodor's concept theory, and we will also divide it into three part:First, Fodor's concept metaphysics, which hold that concepts are mental particular and they exist in our brain as mentalese; Second, Fodor's concept acquisition theory, which hold that concept are not acquired but innate and are triggered by our experiences; and the last, Fodor's concept content(meaning) theory, which hold that the contents of concepts are not decided by inferential role semantics which are holistic but by some way atomic. The inferential role semantics will go against the public constraint principles, and will destroy the foundations of cognitive science.Finally, I will attempt to put forward my own opinions on the third thesis of Fodor's concept theory, that is the controversy of concept holism and atomism. I will attempt to put inferential role semantics and Fodor's information semantics together, and put forward a comprehensive concept theory. This is the most important point and innovations of my thesis.
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