Study On Institutional Change Of China's Agriculture Insurance

Agriculture insurance is an important financial means to evade non-systemic agriculture risks, one of three mî–¯nstays of modern agriculture development, one of Green Box Policies perrr irted by the rules of WTO to support agriculture, has great welfare efficacy and is thought much of by many governments. However, China's agriculture insurance has plunged into a condition of market failure While China acceding to WTO and the agriculture needs insurance urgently because o f both market risks and nature risks.This dissertation has clarified the causes of market failure and institutional supply of China's agriculture insunuice systemically, based on the theory of Pigou's welfare economics and institutional change .It has six parts : (1) It narrates the generality of institutional equilibrium theory and institutional change theory . (2) It analyses the welfare efficacy and market failure causes of agriculture insurance from theoretic and empirical aspects . (3) It clarifies the ultimate cause of China'j agriculture insurance market failure, ie institutional non-equilibrium of supply deficiency type, and discusses the basic logic of institutional change of China's agriculture insurance. (4) It demonstrates the general nstitutional supply to correct market failure of agriculture insurance. (5) It devises China's agriculture insurance system based on the comparison between U.S' and Japan's agriculture insurance institution. (6)It designs China's institutional supplying of agriculture insurance in the concrete, including the legal frameand institutional selections of agriculture insurance.The innovations of this dissertation are: (1) It studies agriculture insurance from the aspect of institutional change and welfare economics firstly in China. The research approach and visual angle are new in the research domain of agriculture insurance in China. (2) It argues that agriculture insurance should have both risk management function and payment transfer function. This function selection can make agriculture insurance bring much welfare efficacy to the economy. (3) It brings forward that agriculture insurance has a character of dual externalities and the government should subsidize not only the insurers but also the insured of agriculture insurance. (4) It puts forward that the ultimate cause of market failure of China's agriculture insurance is institutional non-equilibrium of supply deficiency type. (5) It argues that agriculture insurance should be put in practice by means derivational compulsion. (6) It analyses the institutional demand of agriculture insurance and the interaction of the three main causes of agriculture insurance institution demand of China through an agriculture industrialization case of Gannan Municipality. (7) It devises an operable organization system and management institution of agriculture insurance according to the situation of China.The limitation and further study of this dissertation are: (1) It has not done enough empirical research in China's agriculture insurance because of the absence of agriculture insurance products and the limitation of data collection. (2)The institutional supplying of agriculture insurance includes both formal rules supplying and informal rules supplying, but it hasn't mentioned the latter because of the difficulties of study. It should be improved in these two aspects in the future study.