The Game Theory Analysis Of Chinese Commercial Banks' Governance Mechanism

Entering WTO starts a new development stage for Chinese commercial banks. There are a lot of shortcomings of present Chinese commercial banks'corporate governance structure. Under the current property rights pattern, the board of directors is simply superficial, the board of supervisors is difficult to exert profound influences, and the managers are not given proper incentive and restriction. Therefore, the commercial banks have the supervision and insider control problems caused by the absence of principal, the management and innovation problems caused by the absence of agents, and development problem caused by the absence of incentive mechanism. After China's entry into WTO, the domestic commercial banks are faced with keen competition from the banks abroad. So the study of what determine our domestic banks'governance structure, which pattern is fitter and how to establish effective competitive governance mechanism have important theoretical and practical significances. Game theory is a special method to study the participators'interactive decision-making behaviors, which provide the modern economics with effective analysis implement. This paper uses the asymmetric information dynamic game theory,the principal agent theory and institutional analysis method to construct several game theory analysis models, and proposes applicable commercial bank governance mechanism reform pattern suggestions. This research includes seven parts: The first chapter is foreword, which brings forward the study significance, makes a brief survey of related studies and recapitulates the main contents. The second chapter expounds on the main theory problems of corporate governance, which discusses the related dispute, points out the importance of properly arranging the residue claim rights and control rights, and compares different country's commercial bank governance patterns in order to induce what we should learn from them. The third chapter discusses domestic commercial banks'property rights structure. This part recounts the evolution of our commercial banks'property rights since the reformation, constructs a game theory model of financial market exchanges, and then analyzes the characteristics of state owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial banks'property rights structure. The forth chapter analyzes domestic commercial banks'control rights structure and the influences of commercial banks'state control. After discussing common control rights structures and comparing different country's commercial banks'control rights patterns, this part analyzes our commercial banks'inner control rights structure. The fifth chapter analyzes the principal-agent problems of our commercial banks. This part discusses our commercial banks'principal-agent chains and the state owned commercial banks'administrative principal-agent relationship, uses the asymmetric information dynamic game theory to construct a commercial bank's principal-agent model, and proposes a few suggestions to improve commercial bank's principal-agent relationship. The sixth chapter analyzes the construction and perfection problems of commercial bank's incentive and restrictive mechanism. This part surveys the commercial bank's incentive and restrictive theory, compare foreign commercial banks'incentive and restrictive patterns, studies Chinese commercial banks'incentive and restrictive mechanism, and then uses the incomplete information dynamic game theory to construct a long run commercial bank's incentive and restrictive mechanism model to analyze the elements that determine or restrict the building of an effective incentive and restrictive mechanism. In the end we study the essential elements that affect commercial banks'incentive and restrictive mechanism. The seventh chapter discusses the state owned commercial banks'reformation path selections, which compares three commercial bank's game theory model under different hypothesis to draw the conclusion that the property rights structure and the market structure have direct and salient influences on the commercial bank's governance mechanism. This paper uses advanced economics theory to construct several commercial bank governance mechanism game theory models, analyzes practical problems and makes a few proposals about the improvement of the Chinese commercial bank's governance mechanism. In a word, the paper's logic is clear, the argumentation is strict, theoretical analysis is closely related to the commercial banks'practice, and the conclusions are realistic.