A Study Of Management Model On Lakes And Reserviors

Since 1970s, with the economic development rapidly, the environmental pollution also became very serious. The water quality of the lakes and rivers has worsening dramatically in recent years. It seriously affected the sustainable development of the region. The point pollution and no-point source pollution contributed to river basin’s pollution. The point and no-point source pollution has different characteristics, for example, hard to inspect, so the management model suit to point pollution may not suit to no-point source pollution. So, it’s very importmant to design different management model to different source pollution. We try to find the environmental capacity, the optimal pollution abatement, and design emission permits trading market and incentive mechanism for point pollution and no-point source pollution. It is significant and important to research the behavior stratagem of the benefit bodies and construction of regional environmental management.This dissertation does its research from the following concepts:Environmental capacity is the basis to construct the regional environmental management system. The dissertation established the system dynamics model of lake zoology element, and discussed the zoology element how to influence the environmental capacity. It calculated the amount of inorganic N than the lake accommodate when the water quality standards at the national level I. It can provide a consult for the country in establish the environmental and emission standards.The managers know the current pollution of the area is A and the environmental objectives of the pollution is B, then, from environmental state A to B must have an optimal path. So in chapter III we describe the continuous transformation characteristic of reservoir valley pollution with optimal control theory, and present the necessary condition of optimal control of reservoir valley pollution using maximum principle. At last, we analyze the characteristic and concrete expression of optimal control strategy of reservoir pollution control in different condition.The command-control approach has been unable to control the point pollution effectively, so we must promoted some incentive-based economic instruments. This dissertation focuses on the Tradable Emission Permits system under the total quantity control of the pollution. In the chapter IV of the dissertation we established a multi-objective model of emission permits initial allocation, it consider the efficiency, equity and the production continuity of the company, it also suit the sustainable use of environmental resources.After realize the initial allocation of emission permits, the companies or investment institutions has the initial emission permits. In the same time, it must be imbalance in supply and demand market due to some factors, such as the improvement of the pollution control technologies, and then it will realize the optimal allocation of emission permits through the trade market between owners of emission permits. In addition, the emission trading is incentive for enterprises, to promote environmental quality. The fifth chapter of the dissertation constructed a framework for emissions trading market structure, and designed a double auction trading mechanism that meet the incentive and compatibility conditions based on the framework. At last, a numerical example shows that the trading mechanism is effective and practical.Non-point source pollution is differs greatly from point pollution. It mainly refers to the dissolved or solid pollution that from non-specific location which caused by rainfall or runoff erosion. Because non-point pollution is very difficult to monitor, decentralized nature, uncertainty, delay and other characteristics, the methods (such as tradable emission permits system) that control point pollution effectively can’t work very well in solve no-point pollution problem. Government environmental protection departments and even the public pay more attention to ecological compensation now. It can use for no-point source pollution management. In the ChapterⅥof the dissertation we presented the meaning of ecological compensation, summarized the main object of the ecological compensation, means of ecological compensation. Then use game theory to analyze the behavior of compensation subject and object in ecological compensation, and established the dynamic game theory model between compensation subjects and objects. From the analysis, we find the theoretical reasons of the compensation project that can’t get the expected effect.The traditional compensation model can’t get effective result, in ChapterⅦ, so we established non-point pollution management model based on principal-agent theory under incomplete information. Designing mechanism based on incentive theory can reveal private information of producer. The cost that regulator of governments spend on getting private information is information rent that pays to farmer. It pointed out the causes of information rent producing, that there is asymmetric information between regulators and regulated farmers. We also established the audit incentive mechanisms model to reduce the information rent, but the audit needs cost. So, managers need weigh various costs of different regulation strategies and concluded that we need compare cost of different strategies to have an efficient regulating result by the most economical way.In the end, this dissertation gives the summarizing and the future work.The innovations in this dissertation include:(1) Describing the dynamic model of the regional pollution abatement and the social total welfares by optimal control theory, the model accurately describes the dynamic change process of pollutions in the regional environment. It also solves the model by maximum principle, get the theoretical basis of the optimal pollution abatement and then analyze the characteristic of the optimal path. At last, an analysis of a numerical example is presented and the results indicate the approach is valid.(2) To design a mechanism of competitive bidding in emission permits market is an important problem that needs urgently to be settled in the reform of environmental system presently. The mechanism contains the clearing rule and transaction rule according with the characters of emission permits market are given. This auction mechanism not only ensure real-time clearing of emission permits market, and induce corporation to reveal their true marginal cost, but also make the corporation that low pollution treatment cost treat with more pollution, minimize society emission abatement cost. At last the example results show the efficiency and applicability of the proposed mechanism.(3) Analyzing the behavior of the subject and object in ecological compensation project, established the static and dynamic game model between compensation subject and object. Discussing the reasons that why some compensation projects can’t get the expectant effect. Through the game model, we get the dominant strategy, the quantity of compensation and the environmental quality under complete information. At last, we established the two-stage dynamic game model under incomplete information, analysis two regions’ strategy selection and the incomplete information how to affect the compensation quantity and envir(?)mental quality.(4) This dissertation establishes a non-point pollution management model under complete information. The government completely knows the farmer’s production type, that they can manage the farmers to achieve the environmental targets effectively. Then this dissertation designed the non-point pollution management incentive mechanism under incomplete information. Solving the model we get the incentive measures of the government under the incomplete information, to achieve the purpose that reveals the types of the producer to be regulated. And at last, we established the audit incentive mechanisms model to reduce the information rent.