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Bounded Rationality Dynamic Oligopoly Game Research Under Emission Right Trading Mechanism

Posted on:2015-02-28Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y YuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1261330428455793Subject:Quantitative Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Chaos phenomenon of nonlinear dynamics as one of the most three importantrevolutions in physics of the20thcentury, its cross-subject universality hasdetermined its extensive applicability. This uncertain chaos phenomenon has brokenan invariable deterministic system, which has brought the stabilization system someunstable factors. Chaos theory has made the status of Laplace Determinism waved; ithas negated that uncertain, unpredictable and similar random phenomena will appearin the deterministic system without external random factors.Under the assumption of complete rationality and complete information onmarket of decision-makers, traditional game theory often cannot explain theconclusion drawn. Later scholars have conducted research on the basis of boundedrationality proposed by Simon. As is known to all, opportunities and challenges firmshave confronted in a rapidly changing external environment are enormous; and firmshave been strong and developed rapidly. However, it has resulted in an increasinglysevere environment pollution and ecological destruction which has been the urgentagenda. The American economist Coase has first laid a theory foundation foremission trading in1960; Dales has given a detailed discussion of emission trading inPollution, property and prices in1968. This theory has been of great importance tothe American Legislative bodies, and has been applied in Clean Air Act. So far,emission trading in developed countries has achieved certain results. China startedlate in this area, emission trading mechanism has been introduced originally in the1990s, used to solve the problem of acid rain. Emission trading mechanism has beenthe market regulation tools of allocating environment capacity rationally, whose corecontent has seen the pollution emission right as a commodity, which can be traded as other commodities. Transfer of emission right between high pollution emission andpollution control cost firms and low pollution emission and pollution control costfirms has reduced transaction cost, which has formed the optimal allocation ofenvironmental resources.Emission trading mechanism is a new thing of institutional innovation andtheoretical reformation. The constitution of United Nations Framework Conventionon Climate Change and its supplementary terms Kyoto Protocol in Kyoto of Japan in1997has marked the globalization of environmental issues on the agenda. Althoughthe enthusiasm of environmentalists has been growing around the world;the emissions trading research results have also been sprang up; however, in China,theory and practice research of environmental issues, the awareness degreeof environmental protection and the status of the environment; those of the developedcountries are far apart. For achieving the ecological value of the environment, tomake the emission right truly become an environmental economic system; under thecondition of vested environmental capacity, capable of allocating environmentresources rationally and operating emission market effectively, then theenvironmental problem caused by external diseconomies will be resolved. Once theemission right market which is constructed by emission trading mechanism isestablished, the function of emission right will get maximum use; it will increase thewealth of our society in the future and get a powerful guarantee of material andspiritual civilization.Since the1980s, China has carried out pilot work of emission trading in anumber of cities, and has accumulated some experience; we believe the emissiontrading market will be fully established in China in future. The scale of emissiontrading in China is smaller, energy conservation and voluntary conservation also existtechnical problems. In order to implement the dominance of environmental propertyright trading market, the government promotes energy conservation and low-carbon development, China has continued to establish emission right trading exchange. In the1990s, China has carried out emission trading pilots in Baotou, Taiyuan and other10cities. Later, SEPA has carried out air emission permit pilots in Shanghai, Liuzhouand other cities. However, in addition to Shanghai’s more than40COD(ChemicalOxygen Demand) emission permit tradings, emission pilots in other areas haveexisted trading difficulties. During the "9thfive years" China has taken total emissioncontrol as environmental assessment objective; during the "10thfive years", pollutionemission permit system has been proposed to protect the strategic plan of total control.SO2emission right trading in Jiangsu, Henan, Shandong and other7provinces andcities have carried on SO2emission right trading. Jiaxing has started water emissionpermit trading in2006. SO2trading in Nantong of Jiangsu has first broken throughthe plight of emission trading, which has laid the foundation for the subsequentemission trading. In2008, the establishment of Shanghai Environment and EnergyExchange, Beijing Environment Exchange and other institutions have indicated thatChina’s emission trading has made substantial progress and breakthroughs. In2009,subjected to the guidance of the concept of sustainable development, low-carboneconomy development strategy continued to rise, the potential business opportunitiesof emission right trading have attracted our attention; emission permits have beentraded a lot, emission right market has had a high-speed development. The Ministryof Finance said they would strive to carry out emission right pilots in major citiesnationwide in2to3years.This paper has made a research on the dynamic game behavior of oligarchicenterprise under emission right trading mechanism. It is assumed thatdecision-makers have bounded rationality; combined traditional game theory withnonlinear dynamic system theory; through the result of analysis and numericalsimulation, we get the following conclusions:1. This paper has introduced emission right trading market into dynamic oligopoly game model, considering enterprise development and the status ofenvironmental pollution, on the basis of referring to the foreign experience ofemission right trading, only combine with our actual situation, can we solve theimminent environmental problem most effectively. Although environmental issueshave intensified, China’s emission right trading mechanism is still in the stage ofgradual improvement; our emission trading models have more practical significance;2. In dynamic oligopoly game models under emission right trading mechanism, itis assumed that production cost and pollution control cost are linear and nonlinearforms; price competition and yield competition have been discussed respectively; thevariation of parameters of production cost and pollution control cost of firms, price oryield adjustment speed, marginal allocation of initial emission right, thedifferentiation degree of products and the price of emission right have the effect ondynamic system; through the yield or price bifurcation diagram, the sensitivedependence on initial yield or price of system, the largest Lyapunov exponents andchaotic attractors have been used to describe the chaotic behavior; through numericalsimulation, the complex phenomenon of system from stability to periodic bifurcationand even chaos can be observed;3. This paper has made a detailed analysis of complexion of double dynamicoligarchchs of Bertrand model, Stackelberg model, differentiated product model andthree dynamic oligarchs of Cournot model. In the dynamic oligopoly game models ofhomogeneous products, the effect of the yield or price adjustment speed, marginalcost, marginal allocation of initial emission right on the stability of the system havebeen analyzed; in the model of yield competition of differentiated products, we haveanalyzed the effect of the differentiation degree of products, production cost and theprice of emission right on the system; we have proofed the larger the degree ofproducts differentiation, the more stable the market, the closer actual yield betweenNash equilibrium; 4. When yield or price adjustment speed varies too fast, the system will be inperiod-doubling bifurcation or chaos situation, the market may have been in disarray,companies cannot control the status. Government and other regulatory authoritiesshould prevent excessive price increase and allocate a reasonable initial emissionright; firms should also increase pollution control levels. Models have also usedDelayed Feedback Control method to delay or even eliminate the occurrence of chaoswhich has been proposed by Pyragas since1993.
Keywords/Search Tags:Bounded rationality, emission right trading, strange attractors, fractal dimension, chaos control
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