| The issue of environmental equity is another expression of the issue of fairness in sustainable development.Sustainable development based on the fairness is a shared pursuit for the whole humankind.Researches on the issues of environmental equity cover various topics such as resource consumption and possession,energy consumption,environmental risk tolerance,ecological deterioration and environmental benefit distribution.As for the existing literature,there are rare researches on the analysis of desertification control from the perspective of environmental equity,so it‘s necessary to conduct further studies.This paper takes the construction of enclosed and forbidden reserves of desertified land in 5 counties of Hexi corridor in Gansu province as the research object and makes an analysis of the effects of desertification prevention and control from the perspective of environmental equity.And it also analyzes and evaluates the issues of environmental equity in desertification prevention from the three dimensions of macro level,meso level,and micro level.Based on reviewing and combing the existing literature,this paper defines the concept and connotation of environmental equity in the prevention and control of land desertification,and makes a theoretical analysis of environmental equity from the perspective of economics and then proposes the research dimensions and analytical logic on environmental equity in the prevention of land desertification.This paper attempts to address the following issues.Is the environmental capacity is obtained equally at macro level? Are the environmental governance effects achieved fairly at meso level? How do the environmental equity norms play a role and are the environmental benefits enjoyed at micro level? Based on these questions,this paper will make an exploration and analysis from three dimensions according to different levels of interest groups.And the following conclusions are made below.Firstly,there is a multiple level principal-agent relationships of ―central government-local government-project proprietor-project contractor‖ in the prevention and control of land desertification.The macro-level stakeholder is the central government and the interests are realized through the environmental benefits from eco-engineering projects implemented by local government(county-level government).Therefore,the author takes the county as a basic unit when analyzing main interest groups of land desertification prevention at the macro level and the environmental benefits of specific ecological projects in this research.It can be concluded that the environmental fairness index of Minqin County,Jinchuan District,Liangzhou District,Gulang County and Yongchang County is 1.099252,1.021962,0.930585,1.057349 and 0.952035 respectively from the county level.The qualitative judgment is fair,basically fair,unfair,fair and basically fair respectively.As for the project areas,the environmental fairness index of Susuojing enclosed and forbidden reserve of desertified land(Minqin County),Xiaoshanzi enclosed and forbidden reserve of desertified land(Jinchuan District),Jiacaotan enclosed and forbidden reserve of desertified land(Liangzhou District),Mahuangtang enclosed and forbidden reserve of desertified land(Gulang County)and the north of Qinghe Lvzhou enclosed and forbidden reserve of desertified land(Yongchang County)is 0.991964,1.180518,0.89562,1.117996 and 1.09767 respectively and the qualitative judgment is basically fair,fair,unfair,fair and fair respectively.Secondly,the meso-level interest groups are the agents of local quasi-ecological public goods protection and supply represented by local governments and functional departments.The main variable for environmental equity is the degree of coupling and coordination of the ecological systems and the economic and social systems in the compound ecosystem of the project areas.The project areas with basic environmental equity include Xiaoshanzi enclosed and forbidden reserve of desertified land(Jinchuan District),the north of Qinghe Lvzhou enclosed and forbidden reserve of desertified land(Yongchang County)and Susuojing enclosed and forbidden reserve of desertified land(Minqin County),and their environmental fairness index is 1.028494,0.978016 and 1.042836 respectively.The project area with environment inequity is Jiacaotan enclosed and forbidden reserve of desertified land(Liangzhou District)with an index of 0.941742,and the project area with environmental equity is Mahuangtang enclosed and forbidden reserve of desertified land(Gulang County)with an index of 1.050894.In general,the meso-level stakeholders in the research area are basically fair and the environmental fairness index is 1.01016.Thirdly,as for the micro-level interest groups,the author mainly adopts the dynamic game method and environmental Gini coefficient method to discuss the necessity and reality of environmental equity in the prevention and control of land desertification.And then the author uses the quantile regression method to analyze the influencing factors for obtaining comprehensive benefits at the micro level and makes the following conclusions.First,there is a gap between the actual average value of ecological compensation for residents with 1,740.361 yuan per household a year in the project area and residents‘ expected value for compensation.It can be seen from the analysis of the dynamic game results that only relying on policy intervention will not achieve the goal of effective management.It is necessary to raise the public awareness and exert moral pressure for betrayers under the influence of environmental equity in order to suppress betrayal and promote cooperation.Second,the idea of well preventing and controlling land desertification should follow the principle of the combination of Pigou’s idea with Coase’s thought.On the one hand,the government should be dominant in the management of land desertification and actively intervene in policy formulation,eco-engineering investment,and ecological compensation.On the other hand,it should actively develop the surrounding communities and other non-governmental forces to play a part in the construction and operation of protected areas and establish the environmental equity standards centered on social capital so as to achieve certain internalization of public property rights by recruiting local villagers to participate in project construction and patrolling(contracting for management and protection).Third,the qualitative judgment is fair when G=0.083998 is obtained based on the Gini coefficient.This paper believes that the micro-level interest groups in the project area have no significant differences in obtaining comprehensive benefits as a whole.That is to say,the micro-level interest groups achieve environmental equity in the distribution of comprehensive benefits in the project area.The research finds that the micro-level interest groups enjoy a lower-level environmental equity. |