| Military command is of great significance not only for the final outcome of war,but also for military construction.During the Great Revolution,CPC had not created her own army,but military institutions were sequentially established in both central and provincial level.At the initial phase of Agrarian Revolution,CPC had been enhancing the leadership of armed struggle gradually.Endeavors and trials had been made to concentrate the power of military guidance on CPC central committee,and the focus of guidance was gradually shifted to the revolutionary bases,symbolizing the revolution route had been transformed from "centering on the cities" to "encircling cities from rural areas".Nanchang Uprising(NU),Autumn Harvest Uprising(AHU)and Guangzhou Uprising(GU),were the commencement for CPC to individually lead armed struggle and found army after the failure of Great Revolution.During NU,CPC carried out prudent studies and preliminary explorations about the type of leadership and command authority to be set up.During AHU,CPC Hunan Provincial Committee set up a Committee in Front of Enemy(CFE)as the uprising leading authority."Sanwan Reorganization" established principles and regulations for CPC to play its role of leadership from organizational level,and changed the habits of the old troops and the loose style of peasants.CFE had successively discharged military command authority of old style officers such as Yu Sadu,Su Xianjun,Zhang Hao,etc,distinguishing this troop from its counterparts under the command of old style warlords or KMT.During GU,CPC were unable to establish a robust military commanding system.The GU commander in chief Yeh Ting was unable to execute his commanding authority independently due to the restriction and containment from mutiple-parties,which became the key causes to the failure of GU.Troops led by Mao and Zhu De joined together and stationed in Jinggang Mountains,opening up a new phace in Chinese revolution.The development and evolution of the Fourth Corps,the First Corps Group,and then the First Force became the main vein of CPC’s military history.The competition for authority between Military Committee of the Forth Force and the CFE was in essence the competition between the Party’s leadership and the military command authority.Gutian Conference finalized the competition between Zhu and Mao.The CFE headed by Mao was legitimized as the party’s top leading agency in the Fourth Force of Red Army.However,the gradual expansion of Red Army continuously raised up new issues to the concentration of leadership and unified command.At the historic moment,the General Front Committee Headquarters(GFCH)was established as the top CPC authority in the front line of operations.It was a tortuous process in the replacement of GFCH by the Central Bureau in Chinese Soviet Area,followed by endless argument between the command authority in the front line and the Party leaders in the rear area.The problem was finally resolved by naming the Central Revolutionary Military Committee(CRMC)as the supreme command authority in the front.Settling of argument did not bring stability but sequencial failures of the Red Army in battles,demonstrating that person were the decisive component in military command.The effectiveness of leading and commanding authority of a political party and an army largely depends on the consensus of internal cognition on its route.This paper applies the study method of the divergence in thoughts and the struggle in routes,researching the Futian Incident under the background of the first counter-campaign against KMT.It concludes that the fundmental cause of the Incident was not the expansion of purging ABG,it was a result of the internal fight on revolution routes among the top CPC leadership in the revolutionary bases.To be more specificly,it was the result of intense struggle between Mao and the wrong route.However,the struggle coincidently happened before GFCH’s first Against "Encirclement and Suppression" Campaign(AESC),which directly brought negative influence for the bases preparation.If decisive disposition and complementary measures could not be timely carried out,the whole AESC may face the fate of failure.Under this situation,clearing the expension of ABG gained reasonability to some extent,and became the blasting fuse of Futian Incident.Mao made tough decisions to ensure the defeat of KMT,which was just like a hero cut his own wrist.Long March conducted by Chinese Red Army is an unprecedented maneuver in the history of CPC troops.This period bears significant influence because it witnessed the most fiece internal conflicts and most frequent changes in the CPC top leadership.A"Three-Person Corp"(TPC)composed of Bo Gu,Li De,and Zhou Enlai was set up before the Long March as the top military command authority.Actually,TPC was "2+1",through which Zhou was reappointed.During the early phase of Long March,a "Three-Person Team" composed of Mao,Zhang Wentian,and Wang Jiaxiang,debating dramatically with TPC headed by Bo Gu and Li De against their Left-Wing policy.After several meetings such as Channel Meeting,Liping Meeting,and Houchang Meeting,TPC was abolished during the Zunyi Meeting when Mao’s leadership status was preliminarily established in the CPC Central Committee as well as the Red Army.After the First Force and the Fourth Force of Red Army joined together,there emerged the competition of power again between the leadership of the Party and the command of the Red Army,which resulted in the seperation of the two main forces temporarily.When the main force of Red Army led by CPC Central Committee reached North Shanxi in advance,a new "Northwest Revolutionary Military Committee"(NRMC)was founded to execute the function of"Central Military Committee".However,NRMC did not possess the means and capabilities to command all the Red Army troops.And the conflicts between NRMC of the Party and CRMC of the Chinese Soviet Republic finally ended with the enlargement of CRMC,symbolizing the final establishment of Mao’s Core leadership status in both the CPC Central Committee and the Red Army. |
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