Study On Land Supervision Based On Good Governance

The research on land supervision is of important practical significance with the idea of good governance under the background of further deepening reforms in China.This research is to explore the governance of land supervision based on governance theory,Public Choice and principal-agent theory.The main findings are listed as follows:(1)Factors influencing land governance.There are three fundamental factors influencing land governance: decentralization,government structure,and individual's rationality.Decentralization means principal-agent relationship between central government and local government,which causes principal-agent problems in land governance.The government structure reflects the inherent problems of bureaucratic organizations,including vertical structure which may lead to direct principal-agent relationship replacing ultimate principal-agent relationship,superiors' initiative manipulated by subordinates,and horizontal structure in which each department is closed and separated by interests.According to rational assumption,officials' behavior based on their own interests and goals is apt to deviate from the target of organization.(2)Land supervision in governance.The research studies three stages of governance in the field of land and the background of the establishment of land supervision system.Land supervision has four characteristics of administrative supervision,and is reasonable to be regarded as a kind of quasi legal supervision in China.It has the functions of feedback,prevention,correction and accountability in land governance,and has four major works,routine supervision,audit inspector,special supervision and investigation,which have effect on economy,politics and society.(3)Effect assessment of land supervision.In initial stage,land supervision is conducive to improve illegal land cases finding,and in the long run,it can keep down illegal land cases.The five governance method of Land supervision(files examination,field investigation,problem finding,supervision recommendations,and accountability)and illegal land use indexes(except farmland and field investigation)are in negative correlation,which states that the five methods have effects of reducing illegal land cases.Analysis by cross section data model,land supervision reduced illegal land cases in each provinces of China.(4)Differentiation of land supervision.Methods should be adopted according to the situation because different measure of land supervision has different effects on each land illegal indicator and illegal subject.Based on comprehensive economic points ranking,hierarchical clustering,illegal land status judgement,the research gives references for differentiated land supervision to different areas.(5)Dilemma of land supervision.The research builds a dynamic evolutionary game model based on the principle of cost minimization.The results show that the evolutionarily stable strategies of land supervision and local government depend on the interactions of the marginal cost of local government's fulfilling its obligations to land management,the accountability of local government's non-performance of its obligations,the marginal cost of land supervision,and the incentives from land supervision.Compared with national audit,land supervision has less coercive powers,lower political status and no legal status,though it is more independent.Land supervision is a kind of internal administrative act and its right is derived from bureaucratic administration,which make it get into a controversy of reconsideration and justiciability.(6)Debate on good governance of land supervision.In the end,this paper discusses the establishment of incentive compatibility relations between central government and local government,the construction of land supervision legal system,the improvement of land supervision quality,and cooperative governance,and offers proposals for developing land supervision system.