It takes two: Defending a Two Category solution to the problem of material constitution

My dissertation evaluates the merits of a Two Category solution to the problem of material constitution as it arises for artifacts. The problem of material constitution arises for cases in which it appears that there are two things in the same place at the same time. For example, my statue of Boris Yeltsin seems to exactly coincide with the portion of clay that composes it. A coincidentalist solution to the problem allows for two distinct, exactly coinciding, spatial entities. A Two Category solution is a coincidentalist solution that proposes that the coinciding entities belong to two distinct ontological categories. This sort of solution to the problem of material constitution has been under-represented in the philosophical literature. My dissertation goes some way towards rectifying this situation.;Two Category solutions to the problem of material constitution differ on the ontological category to which each of the coinciding entities belongs. I argue that at least one of the coinciding entities---the lump of clay, or CLAY is a concrete object. The key question then is: to what ontological category does the statue, or BORIS, belong? My dissertation examines in detail some candidate answers to this question. The first of these candidates is what I call the property solution, according to which BORIS is a property had by C LAY. I argue that such a solution does not work, no matter what view of properties one holds. Neither universalist nor trope-theoretic accounts provide us with the resources to adequately individuate BORIS. I also examine an event solution (according to which B ORIS is an event in which CLAY participates), a state of affairs solution (according to which BORIS is a state of affairs of which CLAY is a part), a state solution (according to which BORIS is a state that CLAY is in), and two different process solutions, (one of which has BORIS being a process of which CLAY is a part, the other construing BORIS as a process that passes through CLAY). I argue that no account of the metaphysics of events, states of affairs, states or processes allows for a satisfactory Two Category solution. Again, the main general problem pertains to the individuation of BORIS: no plausible view that enables us to individuate any of the entities that belong to these ontological categories can provide the resources for individuating artifacts like statues.;My dissertation concludes by offering suggestions for what any successful Two Category solution to the problem of material constitution needs to do. We need to more closely examine how BORIS and CLAY must be related, before going on to see what categories of entities subsequently come into view. Ultimately, I suggest, we should consider BORIS to be involved in not one, but two, ontological dependence relations: it is ontologically dependent on CLAY, and it is ontologically dependent on my intention to create it out of CLAY.