| What is the best life for a human being? On Aristotle's view, the best activity for any species of living being is determined by its specific function, that activity, or group of activities, that distinguish that thing from all other living things. In this dissertation, I examine Aristotle's theory of human nature and the relationship that this theory has to his views about the best life. Aristotle's theory about the best life, however, as J.L. Achill recently observes, is "broken-backed," for Aristotle touts the importance of both theoretical activity, the life of pure philosophy, and practical activity, the life of moral and political action.;The texts in Aristotle's writings that support the primacy of theoretical activity are quite rare, and, in fact, there is only one, Nicomachean Ethics Book X chapters vii-viii, that expressly states this position. I challenge the common interpretation of this text by showing that Aristotle is not speaking directly about human theoretical activity at all but about the life of gods and immortal souls. The background for this belief is the position held by Aristotle's teacher, Plato, who championed the notion of disembodied intellectual activity. This is an overlooked, but highly important, feature of Aristotle's philosophy as well, even if the doctrine does not relate to Aristotle's theory of human nature and function as such.;Outside of the present dissertation, there is little controversy that, according to Aristotle, the philosophic life is best and, likewise, that theoretical activity is the most complete realization of human nature. What has vexed Aristotle's readers, however, is the question of how this sort of life is to be integrated, if at all, with the practical life of moral action. If theoretical activity is best, why should it not preempt moral action in cases where the two activities are mutually exclusive? On my view, because of immoralist consequences, this is a difficulty with the traditional interpretation of Aristotle that is intractable. |