| The conventional wisdom is that ad hoc advisory commissions rarely spark government reforms, yet few scholars have examined the impact of commissions or explained why they do or do not influence policy. I argue that the unique political credibility of commissions can enable them to catalyze important reforms that would not otherwise occur, but that they are only likely to do so when the status quo is unpopular and the president and Congress require a focal point to reach agreement on policy change. My theory generates hypotheses that commissions are more influential if they are formed in response to a crisis, are established by the executive branch rather than Congress, and possess a narrow mandate.;I test these hypotheses on an original data set of all 51 national security commissions that reported between 1981 and 2006. A variety of statistical tests is supplemented by case studies of 11 commissions that probed the issue of terrorism over the past three decades. These case studies demonstrate that commissions have spurred numerous major reforms after acts of terrorism, including the largest government and intelligence overhauls since 1947. As a whole, the statistical and case study evidence confirms each of my hypotheses and illustrates that commissions are not just devices used by elected officials to deflect political pressure; they are also powerful vehicles for making public policy. |
