| The purpose of this study is to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein's contribution to the issue of the ethical and therapeutic function of philosophical discourse in the light of the model of philosophical life of Pierre Hadot, exemplified by the Stoic model, and in which this function is central.;The whole study consists of four chapters. The first chapter aims to highlight and analyze the five basic components of the Hellenistic and Roman conception of philosophical life drawn from the interpretation of Hadot which will then serve as guidelines for the exploration of these themes in Wittgenstein's thought : the subordination of philosophical discourse to the ethical way of life, philosophical conversion as personal transformation, askesis as a method of philosophical conversion, the ideal of wisdom as ethical aim of philosophical conversion and the analogic model of philosophical therapy.;In the second chapter, we examine how Wittgenstein can help elucidate the issue of subordination of philosophical discourse to the ethical way of life. First, it appears that philosophical discourse can have the ethical function to express a certain will. Specifically, core values, in connection with a counter-will (needs, tendencies, desires, feelings) underlying preconceptions crystallized in captivating images, form a particular philosophical character and implicitly determine the different conceptions that the philosopher, by the use of his will , makes the choice to express through philosophical discourse. Second, philosophical discourse can have an ethical function to generate good habits, that is to say, to produce an ethical impact on the behaviors that we adopt and the actions that we take repeatedly. Indeed, some conceptual arrangements, if they are in agreement with the effective practices of the human form of life, shed light on our ethical way of life, according to the conception of happiness that we value, so that we can orientate our habitual actions consequently.;The third chapter aims to build on Wittgenstein's contribution to the question of philosophical discourse as a tool for personal transformation based on the model of philosophical conversion. First, it seems that philosophical discourse can give rise to a conversion of the will, synonymous with a conversion of the self to itself, which refer to the tearing away from a certain inauthentic will, inseparable from a counter-will at the foundation of thought expressed through language, to return to an authentic will that coincides with the domain that is specific to the ethical subject that we are. Second, the ethical function of philosophical discourse can also be expressed through the ethical aim of conversion that can be seen as an asymptotic and philosophical ideal of happiness as peace or absence of disturbance based on an ethics of finitude, freedom and authenticity with a transpersonal dimension.;The fourth chapter discusses Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical method through the question of philosophical discourse as askesis . First, philosophical discourse here can have an ethical function when used to operationalize a conversion method consisting of a set of discursive techniques used repeatedly in order to adopt an ethical attitude. Second, this function can be therapeutic in that the conversion method can be elaborated through the analogic model of philosophical therapy, that is to say, as an implicit or explicit conception of disease, of therapy and philosophical health as evidenced by the holistic therapy of language it seems possible to draw from the second period of Wittgenstein's thought.;Keywords: philosophy, Wittgenstein, Hadot, Stoics, ethics, therapeutic, philosophical discourse. |
