The road to the 'Tractatus': A study of the development of Wittgenstein's early philosophy (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell)

I investigate Ludwig Wittgenstein's pre-Tractatus writings and spell out the account of logic he develops in them. I argue that the account holds the key to understanding the Tractatus .; In Chapter 1, I discuss Bertrand Russell's logical theory as the main background for Wittgenstein's early Philosophy. I examine Wittgenstein's initial attempt to address the problems facing Russell's theory.; In Chapter 2, I explain Wittgenstein's account of logic in "Notes on Logic" and "Moore Notes". I present it as an outcome of what Wittgenstein calls his "fundamental thought", the idea that the so-called logical constants cannot be properly represented by linguistic expressions.; In Chapter 3, I discuss the development of Wittgenstein's thought in the earlier part of his wartime notebooks. I argue that what I call the idea of the autonomy of logic leads Wittgenstein to look for a purely logical characterization of elementary propositions. I present the "picture theory" of language as an analogy Wittgenstein introduces to shed light on this problem, and argue that the theory is ultimately devoid of content.; Chapter 4 continues the discussion of the development of Wittgenstein's thought in the subsequent writings. I explain Wittgenstein's "class theory" in the 1915 wartime notebook, arguing that it is an inferential account of language that does provide a purely logical characterization of elementary propositions. I also argue that further reflections on the "class theory" lead Wittgenstein to adopt a new account of logic that is entirely anti-theoretical and anti-metaphysical.; In Chapter 5, I develop an interpretation of the Tractatus based on Wittgenstein's account of logic previously explored. I argue that the account dissolves the problems of logic and philosophy by showing that all questions and answers concerning them, including those in the Tractatus, should be nonsensical. I illustrate a reading of the opening part of the Tractatus in which I take the nonsensicality of its remarks into full consideration, and argue that my interpretation also makes better sense of Wittgenstein's later criticism of the Tractatus .