Nature and ethical life: The family in Hegel's philosophy of right

In my dissertation I analyze Hegel's concept of the family in the Philosophy of Right (1821). I propose an alternative reading of Hegel's theory of the family by raising a question that hasn't yet been posed; namely, how can Hegel claim that the family is---next to the state and parts of civil society---an ethical ("sittliche") institution, while at the same time maintaining that family life is deeply characterized by nature in the form of reproduction, sex, death, feelings, drives, and human needs. The natural and ethical aspects of the family come into conflict with each other because, according to Hegel, nature is marked by contingency, particularity, and immediacy, whereas an ethical institution has to be rational and necessary. Moreover, following the introductory paragraphs of the Philosophy of Right, the family has to be proved to belong to "the realm of freedom realized" (§4). That is, family life is supposed to expose a social practice in which persons can lead their life self-determinedly instead of being determined by nature.;The main goal of the dissertation therefore is to spell out Hegel's concepts of freedom and rationality in respect to the family as an ethical institution, and relate these concepts to the natural aspects of family life. My main argument is that what has been considered to be a conflict between natural and ethical aspects of the family in research literature actually turns out to be an indispensable in support of the concept of family as part of "the realm of freedom realized" (§4). Starting from the assumption that Hegel modifies and extends the Kantian concept of freedom as rational self-determination, freedom in the family is evinced by the fact that family members are able to liberate themselves from natural determination in a rational manner, without suppressing the natural sides of their existence.