| This dissertation has two primary aims. First, it introduces and clarifies The Principle of the Identity of Causal Indiscernibles: ICI If A and B are causally indiscernible, then A = B.;A and B are causally indiscernible if and only if they have all the same causes and effects. Chapter 1 identifies a wide variety of philosophical debates in which ICI is assumed without apparent recognition. This work is valuable first for ferreting out such a widely-held but seldom acknowledged principle and bringing it to light. I argue that ICI is assumed in formulations of The Problem of Causal Exclusion, The Overdetermination Argument, The Causal Argument, The Problem of Qua Causation, and The Argument from the Identity of Causal Roles.;But second, and more substantially, this dissertation is dedicated to refuting ICI and a number of considerations that might be thought to motivate it. Chapter 2 argues against ICI straightforwardly. Chapter 3 raises and refutes objections against the conclusion of chapter 2 that may be found explicitly in the literatures referenced in chapter 1: that if A and B were to bring about a common effect E, then either (i) E would be overdetermined, (ii) A and B would be joint causes of E, or (iii) contrary to appearances, either A or B is only an ersatz cause of E. In chapter 4, I raise two more objections that have been referenced only obliquely in the literature. I clarify and refute each. |
