Search for an ism: British policy in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939--1940

While Hitler, Britain and France largely fiddled during the "Sit Down" war, Stalin pressured Finland for concessions. The Finns refused, and Stalin sent his armies west into Finland on November 30, 1939. The courageous and innovative Finns, so jealous of their independence, actually halted the Russian attacks for so long that the Allies, under pressure both from sympathetic public opinion and the desire for a better war strategy, came up with a plan to "help" the Finns.; As the war blew on into 1940, Britain in particular followed a hesitant policy, despite strong public opinion in support of the Finns. Yet, toward the end of the Winter War, Britain and France were indeed willing to risk war with the Soviet Union to "help" the Finns. How much of this had to do with British realism in wanting to secure Scandinavia as a whole, and how much was affected by statesmen and the public watching this brave and fierce David fight off the Russian Goliath? Common analysis has decreed that it was all cynical British realism, but if so it was tinged with a particular form of "madness" that has not been altogether explored. What breakdowns in analytical process permitted the British to be deluded that intervention could have been effective in achieving any of the stated goals? The seeming roots of British behavior---realism, pluralism, and/or idealism---and an examination of the consequences (both actual and potential), are investigated. What has appeared to be a realist objective of Britain planning to intervene to deny Sweden's iron ore to the Germans is actually far more complicated. There has been little to no political science international relations theory study of this case, and what study and analysis has been done has seem to misplace cause and effect. This area has not had enough light shone on it, as the events of the rest of 1940 quickly dwarfed its seeming relevance. It deserves our dispassionate analysis sixty some years later.