Reason, tradition, and the good: Toward a concept of substantive reason for a critical theory of society

I defend and develop a concept of substantive reason. The concept of substantive reason is that conceptions of reason are determined by the conceptions of the good in a tradition; reason is tradition-constituted. These conceptions of the good are themselves centered around a conception of human nature and the limiting notions, for example, of death, birth, and sexual relations.;The development of this concept of reason brings together two distinct traditions. On the one hand, the tradition of Critical Theory provides a critique of subjective rationality. Following Horkheimer and Adorno, I argue that modernity is dominated by a conception of subjective rationality that reduces all evaluations of ends to the satisfaction of desires. I examine one prominent reaction to this argument offered by Jurgen Habermas who overcomes Horkheimer and Adorno's reliance on a philosophy of consciousness, proposing a new conception of reason, communicative rationality, derived from a philosophy of language. Arguing with Charles Taylor, I reject communicative rationality as too formal.;On the other hand, Alasdair MacIntyre's conception of a reason of traditions provides a way out of the modern predicament. Using Thomas Kuhn's notion of a disciplinary matrix, I expand MacIntyre's account into a concept of substantive reason. I contend that the standards of reason in a tradition are determined by a tradition's conception of the good. I examine several philosophical (such as Aristotelianism, Thomism, Humeanism, Kantianism, Utilitarianism) and natural traditions (of the Azande, Roman Catholicism, and Sioux) in the course of the argument.;Finally, I (1) argue that a conception of tradition-constitutive reason does not fall to a Davidsonian charge of incoherence, (2) agree with Bernstein's argument that relativism is a red herring, and (3) develop an account of reasonable change within and among traditions. Charles Taylor's hermeneutics and Peter Winch's conception of limiting notions are utilized to show how traditions might learn from each other.