The limits of presidential rhetorical power: A case study of Cold War ideology and its influence of America's policies in Vietnam

This study explores the extent to which the ideological forces of Cold War consensus both frame and constrain the powers of presidential decision-making. Specifically, this investigation probes how the evolving premises of the Cold War influenced Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson's foreign and domestic policy initiatives through each successive step leading to armed conflict in Vietnam. Within the parameters of three presidential administrations, this case study incorporates the use of a variety of rhetorical artifacts including presidential speeches, administrative correspondence, agency reports, and congressional proceedings.;An analysis of the documents reveals that while the Cold War consensus contributed to the failure of many of Eisenhower and Kennedy's domestic policy initiatives, both men expanded the rhetorical powers of the presidency through their management of foreign relations. While publicly they distanced themselves from the conflict in Southeast Asia, privately both responded to the premise that a non-Communist Vietnam was vital to American interests by engaging in covert activities. Then, in an act of self-preservation, each concealed from the Nation the dangers of their Administration's growing involvement.;When Johnson became President, he reaped the benefits of the augmented powers of the executive branch as he worked to restore the primacy of domestic policy. But when faced with a series of compromises imposed by the standard-bearers of the Cold War consensus, his plan for a "Great Society" lost momentum. When the discrepancies between his predecessors' public rhetoric and private actions closed the door on available options and raised the specter of direct military intervention, Johnson's capacity for foreign policy leadership diminished as well. Thus, while presidents may gain additional power and prestige through their acceptance and promotion of the Cold War consensus, their capacity for decision-making is ultimately constrained.