British ideas of sea power, 1919-1941

This dissertation analyses the ideas which guided British naval policy-makers during the interwar period, and explores how these ideas influenced naval and strategic policies. These ideas were more sophisticated and coherent than historians have recognised.;Britain's maritime needs were defined in terms of naval standards, which provided only a rough guide for policy-makers' calculations. These standards were bureaucratic bargaining tools which influenced the size of navy estimates on a yearly basis, but were not in themselves responsible for crippling British sea power.;The British public and elites believed that the navy remained crucial to Britain's influence and security, but there was no general consensus on the requirements of sea power. The naval profession sought to prevent the decline of Britain's sea power in many ways, including its attempts to stimulate foreign orders for British-built warships. The officer corps also resisted pressures for democratisation, which it believed would undermine its effectiveness. Nevertheless, its social composition did undergo a significant transformation. The Admiralty's response to demands for the collective representation of the lower deck were based on an idealised conception of discipline, but this contributed little if anything to the outbreak of the Invergordon mutiny. That event was neither the result nor an indication of serious structural flaws in the navy.;The navy's war plans were more realistic than historians have recognised. The navy viewed sea power as a means to exert economic pressure on an enemy and protect sea-borne trade. Fleet encounters never dominated naval war planning or grand strategy. The navy's ability to implement its plans were undermined because its needs were frequently rejected by the civil authorities. Its efforts to strengthen its bargaining position were hindered by the service's strong aversion to publicity, which was only slowly overcome. Because successive governments were willing to disregard the Admiralty's advice on matters relating to maritime security, poor strategic decisions were taken which undermined the foundations of British sea power. If civilian decision-makers had listened more carefully to their naval advisers between 1921 and 1934 they could have greatly strengthened Britain's strategic and diplomatic position during the 1930s and early 1940s.