Analysis Of The Configuration Of Power And Responsibility Between Central And Local Government In Local Debt Governnance

The problem of local government debt has existed for many years in China.Both the academic and practical circles have made countless efforts and attempts to resolve the dilemma of local government debt.The China's Budget Law in 2014 empowers local governments a certain degree of right to issue bonds,stipulated the quota management system for local government bond,and indulged local government debt into budget management.Subsequently,the supporting system of the local government debt,such as early warning mechanism,emergency response plan,and local government bond issuance system,were also introduced.However,by now,the problem of local government debt has not been resolved completely and thoroughly.The scale of China's local debt is still high,and the implicit debt is still a "Sword of Damocles" hanging over the local finances.The "power,responsibility,and interest" between the central and local is unclear and the lack of autonomy of the local finance is the internal reason for the local government's incentives to issue bonds,both of which are the key points of this thesis.Focused on the mismatch of the “power ?responsibility and interest” between the central and local government,this thesis is aimed to research on the solution of the local government debt.After the explanation of the cause of the local government debt from the three dimensions of power-capability-interest,the principle and legal method of local debt governance were put forward on the basis of the experience of extraterritorial domain.The main line of the solution was clearly drawn,the Principle of Non-rescue of the Central Government and the local government's obligation to pay the debt was clarified.What's more,it's also suggested that autonomy of the local government shall be emphasized on.After the fundamental concept introduction,the first part deduces the necessity of governance of local bonds from the perspective of risk prevention,discusses the relationship between the central government as the “supervisor” and the “responsible subject” in the governance process.And other basic issues such as the setting of governance goals is also mentioned.Subsequently,it pointed out that due to various reasons such as fiscal opportunism,fiscal function and the distortion of the central and central relations,unreasonable legislation and law enforcement system,the formation of the real pattern of "legal and disorderly" local debts.At,it is pointed out that the institutional substantial cause of the local debt governance dilemma lies in the imbalance of power allocation and responsibility between the central and the local.The second part is the innovation of the article.On the basis of the first part of the thesis,using the basic theories of the financial law and the financial law,we try to find the deep legal factors in the cause of the local debt from the perspective of power-capability-interest.Specifically,the lack of local fiscal power after the tax-sharing reform has led to the lack of local financial capacity,making it a helpless measure to absorb financial resources through the form of borrowing debt.In addition,due to the diversity of local government interests,local governments face potential conflicts of interest in the governance process.The third part introduces the successful foreign experience in detail.While introducing the system of municipal bankruptcy,debt braking and financial reconstruction in developed countries,the financial responsibility system of developing countries such as Brazil,India,Russia and South Africa are also explored from the legislation level.Besides,in order to provide experience for local debt management in China,the enlightenment of system of debt risk warning,measures of enhancing fiscal transparency,and establishment of an accountability mechanism are also under discussion.In addition,this essay also conducted a normative study on the allocation of power right and responsibility between the center government and local government after the enacting of 2014 China's Budget Law.The fourth part focuses on the principles,methods and value standpoints of power-right and responsibility allocation in local government debt governance.Firstly,based on the plurality of subjects,the diversity of tools and the complexity of interests,this paper puts forward the basic principles of power and responsibility allocation in the governance of local government debt,such as systematic allocation,combination allocation and inclined allocation,in order to provide conceptual support for power-right and responsibility allocation.Secondly,it discusses the role of legal methods contained legal compulsion,interest incentive and structural regulation in power-right and responsibility allocation.Under the guidance of principles,we should optimize the combination of the above methods and use them reasonably to govern local government debt.Finally,considering China's actual conditions and foreign countries experience,this paper points out that "the undertaking of responsibility for debt borrowing","the principal of no debt relief for the center government" and "the criterion of incentive compatibility between center and local government" are the value standpoints that must be complied with in the process of local government debt governance.The fifth part is based on the point that the inconsistency of "power,responsibility and benefit" between center and local governments is the fundamental cause of the dilemma of local government debt.Based on that,this essay explains the top design and implementation path of the allocation of power-right and responsibility between central and local governments.At the same time,it is necessary to confirm and safeguard local public finance fiscal autonomy by the Constitution and other laws,and the rational cutting of the interests between public finance and finance are also the necessary ways to achieve the governance goal.In addition,denying the wrong view that central government must be responsible for local government debt,this essay clearly points out that the center government's role in debt governance is risk monitoring,expenditure supervision and accountability.Only in the case of provincial local government debt crisis happened,the center government takes limited relief responsibility.Finally,it should establish the systematic rules of local government debt management,such as information disclosure,risk warning,expenditure supervision and life-long accountability.