| Overcapacity is an important problem that has perplexed China's economic development,and the central economic working conference held in 2016 clearly put forward the goal of supply side reform.As the top task of China's five supply side structural reforms,“de-capacity” is regarded as one of the core links of China's supply side structural reforms.In order to resolve the problem of the overcapacity,the Chinese government has made initiative attempts and explorations.In recent years,the logic of production capacity management in China has undergone positive changes,which are turned from administrative orders into market decisions gradually.Under this mentality transformation,the capacity of administrative review and approval will be less and less,and the governance of overcapacity will give way to the market mechanism gradually.Then,can the effect of overcapacity management be achieved effectively relying on the market mechanism in the current market environment? It is necessary to be implemented at the enterprise level for the answer to this question.As one of the important subjects for the supply side reform and the direct target of overcapacity reduction enterprises are also the direct target of de-capacity,the enterprises play the most direct role in the process of decapacity.The governance of market guiding overcapacity will be realized by affecting the behaviors of microscopic enterprises ultimately.From the perspective of the enterprise,the response to overcapacity is closely related to the investment behavior of the enterprise.Industry capacity is a collection of enterprise capacity.Enterprise capacity is formed by investment,especially fixed asset investment.Restraining the scale of fixed asset investment in industries with excess capacity is the focus of governance of excess capacity.While restraining the blind expansion of production capacity,the "State Council's Guiding Opinions on Resolving the Contradiction of Serious Overcapacity" also proposes overcapacity governance from the aspects of enhancing the innovation-driven development momentum of enterprises and actively expanding the space for external development,which is implemented in the aspect of corporate investment,namely The transformation and upgrading of enterprises are achieved through innovation,and international capacity cooperation is achieved through foreign direct investment.This shows that energy production is invested in enterprises,and its governance needs to return to the investment behavior of enterprises.The research focus of this paper is to explore the feasibility and realization path of market-led overcapacity management through corporate investment behavior.It is worth noting that exploring whether the market-led overcapacity management is effective and its path is essentially testing whether the enterprise will take corresponding investment actions to achieve the effect of overcapacity control when the overcapacity increases.With regard to the choice of corporate investment behavior,this article discusses the three aspects of fixed asset investment,foreign direct investment,and innovation investment that are most relevant to the governance of excess capacity from the perspective of supply and demand for governance of excess capacity.Specifically,based on combing the literature on the definition,causes,and measurement methods of overcapacity,this paper selects the DEA method to measure the degree of overcapacity at the provincial-industry level.-Data from 2016,empirically tested the impact of overcapacity on corporate fixed asset investment,foreign direct investment and innovation investment,explored its role path,and further tested the impact of overcapacity on the nature of property rights and product market status.The impact of different types of corporate investment behavior.The main research conclusions of this article are as follows:First of all,the overcapacity management under the guidance of the market can play a certain role.When the overcapacity increases,the market's guiding role in resource allocation and the effectiveness of market competition will increase the capital cost of the enterprise and reduce the marginal rate of return on fixed assets investment of the enterprise,and then reduce the growth rate of enterprises' fixed asset investment.At the same time,the supply and demand pressure and product competition pressure brought by excess capacity increase the market-seeking motivation,technology-seeking motivation,and efficiency-seeking motivation of the company's foreign direct investment,which can promote business-oriented foreign direct investment and local production and sales.Foreign direct investment and technology-seeking foreign direct investment.Secondly,the market mechanism required for innovation-driven development is not yet perfect.The source of funding for innovation activities is still self-owned.The shortage of corporate cash flow caused by excess capacity,insufficient corporate funds,and increased operating risks will curb problems.The enterprise's innovation investment is ultimately reflected in the insufficient innovation output of the enterprise,which puts the enterprise into a predicament of homogeneous product competition.Thirdly,although the market-oriented reform process of China's state-owned enterprises continues to advance,state-owned enterprises still bear important social tasks such as stabilizing employment and increasing taxes.At the same time,the natural political connection of state-owned enterprises can bring financing convenience to them,which has led to This shows the weak market correlation of state-owned enterprise investment decisions.The specific manifestation is that overcapacity has a weaker impact on state-owned enterprise fixed asset investment,foreign direct investment,and innovation investment than private enterprises.Finally,based on the theory of competitive strategy,the choice of a company's business strategy is not only affected by the external operating environment but also constrained by the internal resource endowment of the enterprise.There are differences in factors such as the resource endowment of different enterprises.When the overcapacity increases,the investment decision also will be different.When the overcapacity increases,high-product market competitive companies will maintain a high growth rate of fixed asset investment and high innovation investment,while tending to seek OFDI.Capacity cooperation,transfer of excess capacity,and companies with low product market competitiveness are affected by factors such as internal financing constraints and external financing costs.When the excess capacity increases,they will reduce the growth rate of fixed-asset investment and innovation investment levels.It can be seen that market guidance plays an important role in overcapacity management.When overcapacity increases,the role of market resource allocation will reduce the growth rate of fixed-asset investment and promote foreign direct investment.However,simply relying on market forces to manage overcapacity will also lead to problems such as insufficient innovation drive for enterprises.Overcapacity governance should be coordinated with the government and the market.While promoting market forces to eliminate backward production capacity,increase innovation support for industries with overcapacity.Accelerate the development of innovation-driven forces and promote industrial transformation and upgrading.The research in this paper not only expands and enriches the related research on the microeconomic consequences of overcapacity,analyzes the implementation path of market-led overcapacity governance,and provides new evidence for market-driven research on corporate behavior.The selection of strategies to deal with excess capacity provides a basis for the formulation of national policies related to capacity reduction. |
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