| Along with the continuous development of our economy and society,water environment problems are no longer confined within a single administrative area.The transboundary water pollution conflicts have occurred repeatedly,and this problem is particularly prominent,challenging local government environmental governance territorial model.It is an objective choice to solve the problem of water pollution that the government should collaborative governance across regions and departments.The central and local governments have been trying to improve the treatment of transboundary water pollution from the aspects of policy documents and practices.However,there are still many difficulties in the collaborative governance.It is an important content of our country’s environmental policy that how to control the transboundary water pollution effectively and realize the harmony of human and water.As a water-control strategy rising from local innovation practice to national will,the River Chief System(RCS)provides a research scene for discussing government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution.In view of this,this thesis attempts to explore the action logic,examines the effect and internal influence mechanism,and explores policy optimization and institutional innovation guarantee of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution,based on the unique situation of the RCS.It is expected to provide a basis for decision making to enhance the capacity of government governance,strengthen the actions of government collaborative pollution control,and alleviate water pollution problems.Theoretically,the issue of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution involves economics,management and other disciplines.Referring to the theory of public goods,collective action theory,game theory and collaborative governance theory,the SFIC analysis model,the comprehensive framework of collaborative governance,and the"structure-process" model are combined with water resources management reality in China.Based on the logical thinking of "goods attribute-governance subject-governance basisgovernance effect",the theoretical framework of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution is constructed.The main contents include three modules:quasipublic goods attribute,policy implementation and effect evaluation,which reveal the fundamental motivation,governance subject,governance basis and governance effect of collaborative governance,and describe the general operation mode of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution.In terms of the realistic motivation of collaborative governance,the external pull of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution is analyzed from the perspective of the existence of border pollution.Combined with water quality data in seven major river basins in China,the existence of boundary pollution is analyzed by using the estimation methods of SYS-GMM and PSM,and the influence effect and path of strategic emission reduction behavior of local governments are explored.The results show that:(1)There are obvious provincial boundary pollution phenomena in the seven major basins in China,and the pollution level of river water quality monitoring by provincial boundary is significantly higher than that by non-boundary monitoring.(2)The path of action shows that provincial governments have strategic emission reduction behavior,and consciously differentiate the intensity of environmental regulation between provincial border cities and provincial interiors.When the city is closer to the provincial boundary,the intensity of its environmental regulation is correspondingly lower,attracting more industrial enterprises to enter,thereby aggravating the pollution of the watershed boundary.(3)With the increasing pressure on local government environmental assessment,local officials are more motivated to make strategic emission reductions,thus making the border pollution effect more obvious.This conclusion is still supported even when provincial economic development level is taken into account.In terms of the motivation of collaborative governance practices,the intrinsic thrust of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution is analyzed from the perspective of the objective limitations of the territorial governance.The results show that:(1)The evolutionary game of territorial governance behavior of transboundary water pollution government shows that the motivation of local pollution control is closely related to the net income of water pollution control.Although the intervention of superior government constraints improves the space of local governance from non-governance to governance to a certain extent,the non-governance of one party is still the optimal choice for local governments.(2)Compared with local independent pollution control,collaborative pollution control has lower pollution emissions,higher pollution control input,lower river pollution capacity and higher overall welfare level in the two regions.Compared with non-cooperative governance,actors have higher incentive expectations for environmental or economic results of collaborative governance of water pollution,which means that they are more likely to participate in collaborative governance.In terms of collaborative governance policy implementation,the subject,organizational structure,and governance process of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution is analyzed from the perspective of RCS.The results show that:(1)The policy evolution of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution in China can be divided into three stages:early germination under emergency pollution control,active exploration of local practice,and rapid development under rule of law construction.(2)As a typical representative,the operation of the RCS mainly relies on the institutional configuration of river chief rights and responsibilities,the organizational design of river chief system office and river chief system work leadership group,and the systematic support of a series of supporting systems such as river chief meeting system.The governance process of the RCS is promoted through the top-down bureaucracy to determine the goal of collaborative governance,and then to refine and decompose collaborative governance tasks through crisscross conference system,and to conduct comprehensive and coordinated collaborative governance actions by the river chief.(3)Case study analysis shows that the RCS in Tuojiang Basin of Sichuan Province is consistent with the logic of "power and responsibility-institution-institution" and "goal-taskaction".However,the coordination mechanism of water pollution management and the resource guarantee mechanism such as information resources,financial supply,technological innovation,etc.need to be further optimized.In terms of collaborative governance effect evaluation,based on the water quality monitoring data from 2008 to 20 1 8,this thesis takes RCS in the seven major river basins as a quasi-natural experiment,and uses DDD to test the overall effect,dynamic effect,influence mechanism,heterogeneity effect and economic effect of RCS on river boundary pollution control.The results show that:(1)RCS has significantly reduced the contents of COD and NH3N in river at provincial border areas compared with that inside the province,indicating that government collaborative governance can effectively realize the transformation of transboundary water pollution from "beggar thy neighbor" to "help each other".(2)Governance effect of RCS on boundary pollution does not show good sustainability,indicating a shortsighted strategic choice between pollution control and economic performance assessment by local governments.(3)RCS can effectively change the strategic emission reduction behavior of local governments,enhance the intensity of environmental regulation in border areas,narrow the gap between internal areas,and alleviate boundary pollution.(4)There are regional differences in the effect of RCS on river boundary pollution control.Compared with the provinces with the leading economic development level and areas with "province first and city then" in implementation of RCS,river chief system in the lagging provinces and "city first and province then" areas has not achieved the expected governance effect.(5)RCS can significantly promote the economic development of the whole region,including the border areas,and realize the transformation from "clear water and green mountains" to "mountains of gold and silver".Finally,this thesis puts forward policy proposal for policy optimization and institutional guarantee of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution,including:We should construct the interest balance mechanism,improve the functional system of collaborative governance,and establish a unified and collaborative governance institution to strengthen the collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution;improve evaluation mechanism and supervision accountability mechanism,establish precision assistance mechanism,and improve coordination mechanism to improve the effect of governmen collaborative governance of transboundary water pollutiont;construct information management system and improve information disclosure system to improve institutional innovation guarantee of government collaborative governance for transboundary water pollution. |
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