Game Theory-based Research On Energy Conservation And Carbon Reduction Management Decisions In The Steel Industry

The management of energy-saving and carbon reduction in the high energy consumption and high pollution steel industry has become significantly more difficult in the context of the "double carbon target".The promotion of energysaving technology is an inevitable demand for the sustainable development of steel industry,which is also an important implementation program to accelerate the adjustment to the energy structure of the industry and promote low-carbon energy transformation.This study takes the promotion of energy-saving technology,energy-saving and environmental protection investment,and process structure transformation in the steel industry as its research objects.Different game models are investigated for the optimization of management decisions,providing strategies of energy conservation and carbon reduction development for the government and enterprises.This article discusses:(1)using a single energy-saving technology(e.g.,organic Rankine cycle technology)as an entry point to encourage steel enterprises to adopt ORC for low-temperature waste heat recovery,developing an evolutionary game model between the government and the enterprises to analyze the evolutionary stability and the influence of key parameters on the evolutionary trajectory.(2)researching the feed-in tariffs for multiple energy-saving technologies to promote the recovery of waste heat and waste pressure power strategies,and establishing a three-party Stackelberg game model related to steel companies,traditional fossil fuel power producers,the government,and comparing three pricing strategies:fixed price,fixed premium,and variable premium,as well as conducting numerical simulations for sensitivity analysis of the main variables.(3)proposing the investment behavior strategy of emission reduction among steel enterprises under the carbon allowance trading mechanism,establishing an evolutionary game model among enterprises of various scales to analyze the key factors impacting collaborative emission reduction;furthermore,to reduce mutual free-riding behavior in enterprise emission reduction,a carbon allowance trading mechanism is introduced to the basic model to derive the conditions in which the trading mechanism takes effect.(4)combining the baseline value of the carbon emission responsibility accounting method with the Shapley value model to optimize the allocation of carbon emission responsibility among steel enterprises and emission reduction cooperation between enterprises and consumption-side consumers.(5)using the real options method to analyze the investment decision problem of process transformation in the Hebei steel industry.The results of the study indicate that:(1)implementation costs and environmental pollution taxes are very important for ORC technology diffusion;The value of the initial selection probability is close to or greater than the critical value,which is beneficial for both the government and enterprises to promote ORC technology.The government is more concerned about regulatory expenditures and political and social benefits,while enterprises are more concerned about increased taxes and fees on environmental pollution,the benefits of ORC generation,and the benefits of reduced environmental pollution.Increasing operating loss subsidies and technology subsidies,as well as technology deployment costs,are negative for both parties.(2)The implementation effects of three pricing strategies,namely fixed price,fixed premium,and variable premium,vary greatly.Market riskiness changes and government subsidies are the key factors affecting the development of waste heat and waste pressure power feed-in tariffs.The fixed price strategy is adopted at the early stage of development,the fixed premium strategy at the middle stage,and the variable premium strategy at the later stage.(3)Government subsidies and input-output ratios are critical for steel enterprises to reduce emissions collaboratively.Increasing the input-output ratio,the benefits of common products,input costs,government subsidies,and the benefits of free-riding behavior will tend to make enterprises choose the best option.The carbon quota trading mechanism can only be effective when the carbon quotas sold by both parties are greater than the carbon quota threshold.(4)The carbon emission responsibility obtained by steel enterprises is low when the external coke purchasing behavior is not implemented,and it is contrary to the goal of carbon reduction,which does not reduce their own and consumers’ total carbon emissions.The transfer of carbon emission responsibility will weaken the enthusiasm of enterprises with low responsibility for cooperative emission reduction,and this behavior will have less impact on enterprises and consumer-side users.However,the benefit of carbon emission responsibility sold to outside parties will increase.(5)An increase in carbon price drift rate,carbon price volatility,short-process investment demand probability,and decreased coal price will make the industry choose to delay investment for more gain;an increase in the risk-free rate will make the industry choose to invest immediately;and an increase in electricity price will have little impact on industry process transformation.The promotion strategies of energy-saving technologies,the investment behavior strategies for emission reduction among steel enterprises under the carbon emission trading mechanism,the problem of carbon emission responsibility division,as well as the strategies for industry process transformation proposed in this paper,which can provide certain policy suggestions for the transformation of the steel industry and the investment strategies for energy saving and carbon reduction in the later stage.