A Game Theoretic Analysis Of Implementation Of Cleaner Production Policies In Electroplating Industry

Nowadays, it is becoming inevitable trend to promote Cleaner Production in the electroplating industry. However, due to the deficiency of enforcement mechanism, the widespread application of Cleaner Production is still a dream. Therefore, this paper analyses the difficulties in applying Cleaner Production through theoretical analysis and practical demonstration combining of qualitative and quantitative research methods from the perspective of Game Theory, to make several reasonable policy recommendations for the purpose of the effective implementation of Cleaner Production.The paper makes a game analysis on major stakeholders during the promotion of Cleaner Production in the electroplating industry. It is shown in the results that, whether to apply Cleaner Production or not, it not only depends on the decision of electroplating enterprises, but also is influenced by the other stakeholders such as government, the public etc. Thus, this paper carries out a step to step analysis, establishing model of competition game between electroplating enterprises, models game between the local government and electroplating enterprises.First, establish model of the competition game among electroplating enterprises. It is found that, because of the unconsciousness factor in these enterprises, the implementation of Cleaner Production requires the impulse of government. After government regulation, the implementation rate of Cleaner Production is in a monotone increasing situation, coinciding with the growing supervision rate, penalty and preferential subsidies. Moreover, increasing consumer's green demand can also promote Cleaner Production effectively.Then, establish the model of game between the local government and electroplating enterprise. It is discovered that penalty is considered as the most effective method to promote Cleaner Production, the higher punishment, the higher implementation rate and the lower supervision rate. The figures in the case study demonstrate that, when the penalty is adjusted to 1 million yuan, the implementation rate is up to 66.3% while the supervision rate is 40.8%. Adversely, the growing subsidies would lower the implementation rate. Therefore, it is reasonable to offer not more than 10% subsidies. By extending the basic model, it is easily understood that government's supervision is effective to push electroplating enterprises to take cleaner production through incentives and penalties.