The Legitimate Crisis During The Medial Dispute Settlement Mechanism

Through the analysis and reflection on several cases and reports of medical disputes, this paper leads to the legal thinking of current medical disputes surge and its low resolution efficiency in our country; and it also analyzes the patient party's different resistance strategies during the settlement of medical dispute, based on case analysis and some basic theories and methods of game theory. On the basis of previous research results, the paper raises a new classification of medical dispute from the view of the patient party's choice behaviors during the resolution. We divide patients'behavior logic as four ideal types,"lawfully reasonable","lawfully unreasonable","unlawfully reasonable"and"unlawfully unreasonable", so as to intuitively and thoroughly analyze the litigants'behavior logic. The paper introduces the game theory of economics to analyze the litigants'behavior logic during the resolution of medical dispute, and uses the classic theoretical framework of"Prisoner's Dilemma"and"Nash equilibrium"to analyze the patients'different resistance strategies during the resolution so as to find out the basic root of litigants'illegal behaviors: the own structural cause of resolving dispute mechanism. And this structural cause brings the legitimacy of the medical dispute resolving mechanism. The paper elaborates formal and substantive legitimacy of resolving dispute mechanism, as well as relationship between patients'illegal behaviors and strategies. Based on the former demonstrations, it also points out to reform the medical dispute resolving mechanism and fulfill the game balance during the resolution dispute by raising the litigants'value consensus, thus fulfilling the legitimacy of resolving dispute mechanism to reduce the medical disputes and finally achieving social harmony.