A Study On The Principle Agent Problems In The State Owned Shares Of Listed Companies

The principle-agent problems in the state-owned enterprises can be illustrated as follows: There are two principle agent chains in the state owned shares of the listed companies. The principle of the first chain is the government or to say the council of the state owned assets. The director is the supervision department or individuals of the state owned assets. And the agents are the managers of the listed companies. Besides, another principle agent chain is existed in the current listed companies where the principle is the external investors, which we often call the middle or small shareholders and the agent are the large shareholders. In the first principle agent chain, we want to illustrate the high agent cost because of the absence of principles and the low efficiency of the director. We constructed the utility function of the director and the agents to get the gamble result of them, which is the worst situation for the state owned economy. The problem of unreasonable equity ownership structure can be illustrated by the second chain By means of the compares of cash dividend between Chinese and American companies, we got to the conclusion that the profits of the middle small shareholders had been seriously deprived.