Strengthen The Implementation Of DSB Decistions: Reform Of WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding

Although WTO created a more rule-based dispute resolution process, the new process failed to eliminate the lack of compliance associated with the GATT dispute settlement mechanism. Compliance with many decisions of DSB was lengthily delayed or could not even been finished, which not only directly threatened the legitimacy of DSB but also weakened the efficiency of the entire WTO system. The delay and non-compliance also demonstrates the need to reexamine the WTO retaliation-based enforcement mechanism and to supplement or improve it.Factors influencing compliance with DSB decisions are various, overlapping and intermingling in each individual case. These factors include the ambiguities and inconsistency contained in the DSB text, inadequacy of incentives or sanctions for Members to promptly comply with the decisions and the lack of domestic political and economic pressure of Members. The former two factors root in the system of DSU and are the inherent consequences of thedefective DSU. The latter is a non-systematic factor with few relations with DSB per se. Systematic defects can be improved through textual revision and system reform. On the other hand, non-systematic defects may also be restricted due to the diminishment of systematic defects.This dissertation makes a one-by-one analysis of all kinds of systematic and non-systematic factors affecting the compliance with DSB decisions. By introducing the ongoing negotiations of the reform of DSU, the dissertation illustrates the possibility of strengthening the compliance with DSB decisions and the problems encountered during the reform. The first chapter briefly introduces GATT dispute resolution system, the current dispute settlement regime under the WTO and its history of reform through several rounds of negotiations.The second chapter focuses on the systematic defects affecting the compliance with the DSB decisions. It begins with the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the DSU text resulting in unclear compliance procedure, which include the uncertainty of the arbitration procedure, principle and grounds for deciding the reasonable period of time, the inconsistencies of Article 21.5 and 22, and the lack of pre-determination of level of nullification and impairment. The second sector concerns the inadequacy of incentives or sanctions for Members to promptly comply with the decisions. First, the irretrospective nature of DSU causes the lengthy delay. Second, the existing compensation and retaliation mechanism is insufficient to encourage compliance. Merely reforming the existing system is not adequate to solve the problem. Introducing more options of incentives and sanctions are necessary as well.The third chapter discusses the non-systematic factors affecting the compliance with DSB decisions. The first sector illustrates a variety of elements affecting compliance by using the United States—Gasoline case as anexample. The second sector analyzes these factors one by one, including the complex of the Members' domestic legislative procedure, the battle of different groups of interest, pressures from the international society and the effect of DSB decision within the Members' legal system.