Optimal Decision Of Enterprise Production And Emission Reduction With Carbon Tax Policy Considered

With the issue of global warming is becoming increasingly serious, people havepaid more attention on it. Also, the issue has become the focus of discussion of theentire international community. Scientific researches have shown that it is the carbondioxide and other greenhouse gases produced from daily life and production activitiesof human beings that caused global warming. And the warming of the global climatein turn has a negative impact on the survival and future development of human beings.Therefore, many countries have taken measures to control the emission of greenhousegases and encouraging enterprises to adopt low-carbon development strategy. Thus,the concept of low-carbon economy has formed. The so-called low-carbon economyrefers to the mode of economic development with lower carbon emission, lessenvironmental pollution and more economic output. Its essence is to improve energyefficiency and optimize the structure of energy use. Its core is technology innovation,system innovation and the transformation of the concept of development.Under the background of low-carbon economy, in this paper, we used the externaltheory, game theory and other relevant knowledge to study the effects of carbon taxon enterprises’ production decisions and the level of purification rate. We alsoexplored the behavioral game problems between the government department and theduopoly enterprises which have their own strategies of abatement or not. We hoped toseek the optimal output and profit analytic through the establishment ofgovernment-led Stackelberg game model. In the modeling process, we selected themaximization of total social welfare, including economic, social and environmentalbenefits, as the goal. The consideration of these three parts makes our study differentfrom the previous and is also the innovation of this paper.Finally, through numerical analysis, we studied the changes of duopolyenterprises’ output, profits, purification rate and changes of total social welfare withthe growth of the carbon tax under the scenarios of unified carbon tax anddiscriminated carbon tax respectively. We hope our research has a certain referencemeaning for the government to develop a reasonable carbon tax mode.