Asymptotical Stability Analysis Of Evolutionary Equilibrium In Multi-population Evolutionary Game And Its Application

Evolutionary game theory is being extensively applied in the various fields ofsociety with the continuous development of evolutionary game theory. This papermainly studies the issue of multi-population evolutionary game theory and itsapplication. The basic theory of evolutionary game is simply reviewed; thecharacteristics of evolutionary game theory and the value of study on evolutionarygame theory are briefly introduced in the chapter two of this paper.Under bounded rationality, a dynamical replication system of three-population2×2×2asymmetric evolutionary game is established in the chapter three of this paper,applying the replicator dynamics which is basic dynamic concept of evolutionarygame theory. The asymptotical stability of the dynamical replication system’sevolutionary game equilibrium is analyzed by using the method of dynamic system.Some conclusions are obtained, and the results are applied to two examples.The academic fraudulent practices are being spreaded and difficult to hold backat home. The harness of academic fraudulent and putrid practices depends onscientific researchers’ units in the current situation, which the state hasn’t yetinstituted standard of academic or established the institution that specialize inharnessing academic fraudulent practices. In the chapter four of this paper, a gamemodel between the scientific researchers and their units is established based on theevolutionary game theory and made an evolutionary analysis. The evolutionarycondition and path of the behavior selection in decision-making of the scientificresearchers and the units are obtained. At last, some strategies and measures forsupervising academic fraudulent practices are proposed.