Analysis Of Optimal Balking Strategies For Customers Based On The Maximum Entropy Principle

In everyday life,the phenomenon of waiting in line can be seen everywhere.Waiting is often boring for customers.Further more,without knowing how long to wait makes customers feel even more frustrated. So,to improve customers’waiting desire and reduce the loss of customers,service agencies usually inform the customer about the delay information.For example:the customers may be informed the rang or the mean or the variance of the service time,and may be the exact time.The different information would bring different effects for customers’balking strategies.Based on the Geom/G/1multiple vacation queuing and M/G/1single vacation queuing model,through a natural reward-cost structure,the overall profit function about the individual customer and the whole society are constructed by a method of mean value analysis.Then,the customer equilibrium balking strategies and socially optimal balking strategies have been studied under the different types of limited on service time.Because of the same information may cause different effect for different customers,we assume that customers obey the maximum entropy principle,that is based on the partial in-formation,customers will choose a distribution function which entropy value is maximum,and don’t change the original constraints or increase subjective bias.