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Research On Mass Emergencies Under Government Supervision With Evolutionary Game Theory

Posted on:2014-01-27Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:B S XieFull Text:PDF
GTID:2256330401959977Subject:Management decision-making and system theory
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the beginning of the21st century, along with the deepening of the reform and opening up in China, the prominent social conflicts results in more and more mass emergencies. Compared with the past, mass emergencies are bigger, involved a wider range of occupations, so that the harm has already affected the construction of the socialist modernization. As the social manager, it is Government’s basic duty to take charge of the mass emergencies, which is one of the important indicators to measure the ability of the Government. Aiming to provide theoretical support for Government supervision, the main content of this paper is how Government effectively monitors mass emergencies, which also enrich and develop some basic theoretical research of our community emergencies.First of all, by analyzing the current status quo of mass emergencies from a general overview, basic characteristics, main reasons, pros and cons, it is pointed out that Government should face up the adverse effects of mass emergencies. Meanwhile, if Government supervises mass emergencies effectively, there is a very important practical significance.In response to mass emergencies, Government plays two kinds of functions:conflict parties with direct interest and non-interest coordinators. The next part of this paper is how Government regulates mass emergencies as the different parts. Usually, mass emergencies result from conflict by groups with different interest demands. It is impossible to happen suddenly, but rather a dynamic process with constant learning and adjustment. So, this paper will introduce evolutionary game theory to the field of the research on mass emergencies under Government supervision.Because of the high attention, network group events are chosen to discuss the responsibility of Government as conflict parties, and the game theory is first introduced for analyzing the internal mechanism. While ordinary masses are unable to correctly identify network information as non-direct-interest participants, this paper firstly study on network group events under imperfect information. On the basis of the game model between Government and network masses, some perfect Bayesian equilibriums are reached under parameter constraints. It is pointed out that our country accord with such two cases:part of success of social management, near-failure of social management, as well as the importance of the regulating Network Group Events. The study concludes that our country can’t avoid network group events, and Government should monitor through the establishment of early warning mechanisms and other means.Then, considering some "sensitive" information is easy to breed network group events, the evolutionary game model is built between Government and network masses. Combined with the reality, equilibriums in different stages are created under parameter constraints, together with the analysis of practical significance. Meanwhile, the case of "Zhou Jougen Incident" illustrates the applicability of our model. By the way, the numerical analysis shows that the impact information mechanisms have a huge impact on the speed of network group events. In order to control,"guide", one of the emergency measures, could quell the events and effectively alleviate contradictions during social change. At the same time, the model explains why network masses spread related information.With the evolutionary game theory, we analyze the importance of the government as a coordinator in emergencies. And under the principle of fairness, particular analysis of some key parameters on the decision-making behavior is described. The results show that the government intervenes early, along with fair redistribution of benefits and appropriate penalties, which will help to reduce the harm of mass emergencies. Finally, along with the analysis of the evolutionary process of the case "Taxi strike in Chongqing" and the government’s coordination, it illustrates the applicability of our model.Finally, we make the overall research on this article, and point out the deficiency, as long as some places worthwhile concerned in the future study.
Keywords/Search Tags:Government supervision, Mass Emergencies, Evolutionary Game Theory, Network Group Events, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
PDF Full Text Request
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