A Query On The Dilemma Of The Credit Theory

The current debate in epistemology starts from Gettier problems, which pose huge challenges to the classical definition of knowledge, Justified True Belief (JTB). The fact that true beliefs agents in Gettier cases acquire are justified in a certain lucky way push epistemologists to conclude that knowledge is more than JTB. The Credit theory, an important proposition supported by Virtue Responsiblism which emphasis on intellectual abilities, provides an alternative by emphasizing the salience and importance of the agents’virtue in the process of knowledge acquisition. The value of knowledge is manifest at the same time. However, it also faces another challenge from testimonial knowledge in that in a typical testimony situation the speaker, rather than the hearer, deserves the credit. Therefore, the Credit theory faces a dilemma that it will either allow the true beliefs in some Gettier cases be knowledge, or it will disclaim testimonial knowledge.The purpose of this paper is to vindicate the Credit theory by answering some query including those from testimonial knowledge. Firstly, only irreductible testimonial knowledge can be the problem for Credit theory, while the agents’virtue is properly involved in the process of knowledge acquisition in the case of reductionism for testimonial knowledge. Three arguments for anti-reductionism, which are, a prior acceptance principle, self-trust entailing trust others, the model of testimony being assurance, are not properly supported. On the other hand, reductionism has three evidences, the agreement between testimonial knowledge and posterior facts, Bayesian reference and the Best Explanation rationale. The distinction between testimony and testimonial knowledge should be made in order to improve the standard of knowledge.Secondly, this dilemma is the conjunction of two difficulties faced by the strong and weak version of Credit theory on its own. It could serve as the evidence of the explaining powerfulness of Credit theory, in that strong credit theory could solve Gettier problems while the weak one include testimony as a type of knowledge. Some are worried that as a variant of contextualism, the Credit theory may also face the same problem, robbing proper subject matter and objectivity of epistemology by making the standard of knowledge relying on linguistic discourse. Facts set strict limitation for linguistic expression. Besides, the value of knowledge also implicates the participation of intellectual virtues, which is why knowledge is more valuable than true belief.Thirdly, some start to reflect whether luck could be compatible with knowledge after years of failed efforts by removing luck from knowledge. Duncan Pritchard holds that knowledge is compatible with environmental luck but not interfering luck. However, environmental luck is the combination of facilitating luck and interfering luck. Mylan Engel is successful in arguing that knowledge is incompatible with either vertical luck of evidential luck, which could act as a disproof that the purpose and the interest of Credit theory are mis-directed from the very beginning.