Inequality Rather Than Demand As The Cause Of Trouble:the Logic Of Famers’ Behavior In Implying The Public Policies

In this paper, the author will use village a and village b in Heilongjiang province as the unit of analysis, and combed the change of the rural minimum living guarantee quota from village a to village of b, and on this basis analyses various demanding types of famers’behavior logic after distinct principles of distribution.This article argues that the policy running seven years ago has realized the system of subsistence allowances for urban and rural difficult to cover all urban and rural areas, about 75000000 people’s basic living get effective guarantee, at the same time, with the rapid development of urbanization, industrialization, market economy, improve the level of peasant economy, fair consciousness enhancement, the implementation of the policy is facing a new round of challenges, mainly manifested as:unfair low policy operational consequences are not guaranteed, dislocation phenomenon is prominent, obvious phenomenon caused by the relationship between insurance, at present, the transition phase farmer’s interests demand to minimal assurance policy experiencing economic appeal to fair appeal, from the state-social institutional framework to analysis, first of all, interest demand policy from top to bottom grassroots and policy object transformation leads to conflict, seriously affect the policy function, secondly, farmers as the object of policy interests of policy itself in the ever-changing, descending process of change and the national policy in-depth appeal conflict occurred, behavior logic indirectly affect the village administrative subject, cause the policy transformation and distortion. In order to implement the policy of minimal needs, this paper attempts to transfer to the village of b from the a through the village of minimal assurance quota process, various types of farmers appeal of psychological and behavioral logic to generate different allocation principle, to analyze from the country-social institutional framework, because farmers interest demands to minimal assurance policy transformation (namely:economic interests --equity) and produce "mismatches households", for the equity of minimal assurance policy:inequality is not scarcity, "mismatches households" is different from "low marginal groups", low marginal groups is wandering in the minimum living guarantee standard line above the group, for the interests of minimal assurance policy still remain in the economic appeal, "mismatches households" for the economic demands minimal assurance policy is not essential, is essential for equity, that is to say, on the basis of equity, even if all the people are not living is also possible, otherwise, the type of case occurs in this thesis:equity of violence under the.From the analysis of farmers to the perspective of equity of minimal assurance policy, causes affecting the policy function, equity behavior logic by farmers "zero sum game", reflect the policy downlink and farmer behavior logic and interests conflict transition game, in the game of the conflict in the analysis process, the focus on policy downlink and farmer’s interests demand conflicts "dislocation group", to the principle of fair distribution and methods of searching for the farmers for low interest appeal in the transition period, the farmers how to pursue equality rather than efficiency, at the same time to reflect, in the process of policy implementation, why not play the role of democracy. The author thinks, this may be the only opportunity to minimal assurance policy settled to form of democracy in rural areas, but also in the specific historical period of a flash in the pan to no longer be copied.