Construction And Analysis Of The Game Model Of Third Party Governance Of Environmental Pollution

At the beginning of twentieth Century,China’s science and technology and social productivity level has entered a period of rapid development,however,in the rapid development of social economy at the same time,due to excessive use of natural resources,China’s environmental destruction,the increasingly serious environmental problems.In the face of such environmental problems in China,the original industrial pollution "who pollution,who governance" environmental pollution control mode gradually transformed into "who pollution,who pay,third party governance" model.In the process of implementation of environmental pollution control third party in,due to the existence of information asymmetry between the government environmental regulators and the third party enterprises,regulatory authorities in environmental supervision of the third party and the sewage enterprises whether in environmental service activities to practice fraud hands and third party enterprises and sewage enterprises prone to collusion the external environment is not economic,produce.Therefore,how to avoid the collusion between the third party enterprises and the sewage enterprises is an important work of the government environmental supervision department.This paper attempts under the assumption of limited rationality,the method of dynamic evolution game based on the related research,analysis of environmental pollution control third party in the process of choosing between the government and the third party governance and enterprise sewage behavior of enterprises,through the establishment of the corresponding evolutionary game model to find out the influence of both variable strategy choice behavior,and according to the analysis in the equilibrium solution.By using the Vensim software to establish the environmental pollution control third party evolutionary game dynamics model,the simulation analysis on optimization model of the original model and the different control situation,the stability of the equilibrium point of the various scenarios.Through the simulation of dynamic model of evolutionary game system of environmental pollution control third party to get the following conclusions:(1)The SD model of evolutionary game simulation of pure strategy and mixed strategies as well as the general strategy that the system does not have the evolutionary game evolutionary stable equilibrium state of environmental pollution control third party system,in the process of evolution of game the fluctuation,repeated shocks trend.(2)Analysis system evolution scenarios show that when the government punishment respectively increase penalties for third party enterprises or sewage enterprises,can have very significant effect in the short term,the probability of third party or enterprise law-abiding sewage enterprises continue to rise,the credibility of the government and the environmental benefits are met.However,from the view of long-term development,whether the third party enterprises and sewage enterprises exist great volatility violation probability,the amplitude of the game process is increasing,the government of the game process is more difficult to grasp.(3)Dynamic simulation shows that under the situation of punishment punishment strategy can adopt the dynamic game process evolution to control environmental pollution third party system and effective governance of repeated shocks,the existence of stable equilibrium evolutionary game system.However,the stable equilibrium state is not ideal,there is still a high probability of illegal sewage companies.(4)The optimization of dynamic penalty incentive scenario is to solve the dynamic penalty scenario system evolutionary stable equilibrium is not an ideal situation,through the analysis of the dynamic evolution of the influence of punishment under the stable equilibrium strategy to optimize the factors.The scene is simulated and the simulation results demonstrate that the theory,results: optimization of dynamic penalty incentive strategy can get stable system evolutionary game equilibrium,and the status of the three party enterprises and sewage enterprises violations have been effectively suppress.