Research On B2C E-Commerce Credit Problems In China Based On Gametheory

In recent years,the Internet industry has developed rapidly.In this context,e-commerce has also been able to develop rapidly with the help of Internet technology.Nowadays,as long as people use a mobile phone and a tablet computer,they can achieve online shopping,which greatly facilitates people's lives.In addition,the rapid development of e-commerce also brings many problems,among which the e-commerce credit issue is the most critical.Compared with the past,e-commerce credit issues have become more serious.Due to the virtual nature of the network,openness,and cross-space-time features,it is difficult for both parties to understand each other's real conditions.Therefore,it is very important to study the issue of e-commerce credit,and the research on domestic B2 C e-commerce credit issues will promote the healthy development of e-commerce market.This paper applies the game theory to the study of B2 C e-commerce credit issues and analyzes the credit issues.First,it elaborates the definition and characteristics of e-commerce and credit,and uses classical economics and western economic theory to analyze credit issues.Secondly,it analyzes the history and current status of e-commerce development,and explores the current status and causes of e-commerce credibility issues.Third,this paper analyzes the game between players in the e-commerce market through game theory.Through the game between users and enterprises,in the context of repeated games,when the company's profits increase and when it pays attention to long-term profits,e-commerce companies tend to operate with integrity,and the amount of fines imposed by regulators on fraudulent enterprises will also affect the integrity of enterprises.behavior.Under the condition of incomplete information,the increase in the amount of fines and the system of credit rating system will increase the camouflage cost of those companies with bad credit,and companies with poor reputation will no longer disguise themselves as enterprises with good reputation.Through the game between enterprises and enterprises,the behavior of enterprises is greatly affected by the supervision of the platform and the government.In addition,when the products of creditworthy companies are differentiated and branded,the profits of creditworthy enterprises will be less influenced by the infidelity behavior of other companies,and creditworthy enterprises will continue to maintain good faith operations.In the case of incomplete information,low-reputation companies will set lower prices to make up for their disadvantages in terms of credibility,and high-reputation companies will set higher prices to make up for their higher credibility costs.Through the game between the enterprise and the platform,it can be known that the increased supervision of the enterprise will make e-commerce companies prefer to operate with integrity,the enterprise platform rewards credit-worthy enterprises to a certain extent,can increase the opportunity cost of e-commerce fraud,and also make the enterprise More inclined to choose honest behavior.Through the game model of the government and the platform,we can understand that the efficient supervision of the government has made the platform more honest and more inclined to monitor the bad e-commerce companies.Finally,according to the results of the game model in this paper,relevant policy suggestions are put forward,and it is proposed to accelerate the establishment of the B2 C e-commerce credit system,build a credit rating system for users and enterprises,and improve the relevant laws and regulations of e-commerce credit,thus more effectively solving China's B2 C e-commerce credit issues.