Research On Evolutionary Game Of Cooperative Innovation Of Low Carbon Technology In Industry-University-Research Institute

With the continuous refreshment of summer maximum temperature records around the world,the adverse effects of abnormal climate changes on human production and life,the crisis caused by global warming on human living environment once again attracts people's attention.Developing low-carbon economy is one of the most effective ways to control the greenhouse effect.Low-carbon technological innovation is the main means to develop low-carbon economy,and collaborative innovation of industry,University and research is an effective mode to develop low-carbon technology.Firstly,this paper uses decision-making experiment and evaluation laboratory method,interpretative structure model,combines the two methods,extracts their advantages and discards their shortcomings,so as to construct a brand-new interpretative structure model after optimization and upgrading,and uses this method to explore the main influencing factors of collaborative innovation of low-carbon technology in industry,University and research,and then uses expert scoring method to summarize the most.The first level is the penalty for breach of contract,which has the most direct impact on the success of collaborative innovation of industry,University and research institutes.The middle level factor is the core part,which mainly includes six factors,namely,the allocation of synergistic benefits,risk sharing mechanism and national environmental regulation.The soundness of laws and regulations at the lowest level of the structural model,as well as the financial support of financial institutions and related services of intermediaries at the fourth level,are all the global factors affecting the collaborative innovation of low-carbon technology in industry,University and research institutes.Next,we construct an evolutionary game model,list the payment matrix,and then analyze the evolutionary game strategy of collaborative innovation of low-carbon technology in industry,University and research.Five equilibrium points are calculated according to the replicator's dynamic results,namely E1(0,0),E2(1,0),E3(0,1),E4(1,1),E5(x*,y*).Among them,E5 is the saddle point,which is not the focus of this paper,so we focus on the performance of the remaining four equilibrium points.The analysis of chemical stability divides it into six cases to analyze and simulate,analyze its evolutionary direction under different initial values,and get its evolutionary path map.It is found that the evolutionary direction of case V and VI is uncertain,and the result of case V does not belong to the focus of this study.Therefore,the factors affecting theAbstractIIIconvergence of game results to equilibrium point E3(1,1)in case VI are further analyzed.The results show that liquidated damages,synergistic benefits,government subsidies,carbon emission difference and carbon emission tax have positive effects on synergistic innovation,while R&D costs and knowledge spillover effect have negative effects on synergistic innovation.The effects of cost-sharing ratio and income-sharing ratio are non-unidirectional.Finally,according to the results of the study,the shortcomings of this paper are explained,and the future research directions are clarified.At the same time,some suggestions are put forward to promote low-carbon technological innovation inindustry,University and research institutes from the following four aspects:incentives and punishment mechanisms are parallel,intellectual property protection measures are strengthened,reasonable proportion of synergistic income distribution is determined,and trust mechanism is constructed to promote the cultural value of industry,University and research institutes.