Research On The Model Improvement For Government Purchasing Suburban Railway Transportation Service Based On Game Theory

In recent years,with the acceleration of China's urbanization process,the city's scale has continued to expand,and the urban population has proliferated.Measures to adjust the urban structure and dismantle the population of the core area have been widely implemented in major cities.This has caused a large amount of time-concentrated commuter flow between the urban suburbs and the core area,which has made it difficult for the existing urban public transportation system to meet the demand.So,the development of suburban railways has become an inevitable choice.The local government purchases suburban railway transportation services from transportation enterprises as the suburban railway operation mode that is mainly used in various parts of China.It has achieved certain results in practice.However,there are many shortcomings in the modes adopted by local governments in purchasing transportation services.There is a lack of incentives for transportation companies,and transportation companies have incentives to falsely report costs and losses.Based on the analysis of the existing literature research,this paper summarizes the three types of government purchase transportation services,such as direct grant and subsidy,direct grant and incentive regulation,and franchise bidding,mainly through the case analysis of the Shanghai Jinshan Railway,the Irish Railway and the suburbs of London.Case studies of suburban railways and other government purchase transportation services have shown that the efficiency of these three modes is gradually progressive in practical applications.Then,based on the game theory perspective,this paper establishes a theoretical model for each of the three modes above,and conducts a mathematical analysis of the implementation effects of each model.It is concluded that in the direct grant and subsidy mode,the transportation enterprise does not have incentives for a high level of effort,and there is a greater probability of false reporting of costs and losses;in the direct grant and incentive regulation model,local governments can effectively encourage transport companies to exert appropriate levels of effort to maximize social welfare;in the franchise bidding model,the best-quality transportation companies will win the auction,and local governments and transportation companies can simultaneously maximize their respective interests.Finally,according to the theoretical models of the three modes,the actual situation of Beijing suburban railway is taken as the application object.Through the applicability and the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages,the model improvement plan for the purchase of suburban railway transportation service in Beijing is given.This paper proposes policy recommendations such as improving government procurement of transportation service contracts,accelerating the construction of an effective competitive market,reducing or integrating intermediate links,and providing mechanism guarantees.This paper systematically summarizes and sorts out the model of government purchasing suburban railway transportation service,and innovatively uses game theory and its derived new regulatory economic theory and auction theory to establish corresponding mathematical models.In the incentive regulation model,linear incentive contracts are introduced to realize the incentives for transportation enterprises.The comprehensive evaluation index parameter is introduced into the franchise bidding model to study the impact of quality attributes on bidding.It helps to enrich the basis for the study of the efficiency and efficiency of purchasing transportation services in the suburban railway sector to a certain extent.