Research And Analysis Of The Behavior Of Bitcoin Mining Pools Based On Game Theory

Introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008,bitcoin has received great attention all over the world,and more and more miners have joined the mining team.However,as the difficulty of the bitcoin network increases,it has become more and more difficult for solo mining,and the mining pool was formed.Although Bitcoin has become the most popular digital currency today,the security of its network is still worthy of widespread attention.Since almost all new bitcoins nowadays are minted by mining pools,the safety of mining pool is quite critical to the health of the Bitcoin system.Among the attacks targeting mining pools,the distributed denial-ofservice(DDo S)is the notable one.Johnson et al.used game theory to analyze the motives of DDo S attacks between two mine pools.In this paper,we improved the game theory model of Johnson et al.,which add DDo S defense costs and operating costs.And limited the distribution of power in the mining pool,we obtain conclusions.1)If the failure probability of DDo S attack is high,then mining pools would have a greater incentive to stay peacefully.2)When the resources of the mining pool are limited,increasing the computing resource in mining is always the primary choice for mining pools,no matter whether they are launching DDo S attacks or under DDo S attacks.When the Bitcoin network is not attacked,as the block rewards decrease,the transaction fee will be the main source of income for miners.Carlsten et al.proposed the concept of gap mining at CCS'16.Tsabary et al.proposed a static game model analysis for gap mining at CCS'18.In this paper,we improved and expanded Tsabary's model.We use the ratio of the actual running time of the active mining machines in the mining pool to the running time of all the active mining machines in the network as the probability of the successful mining of the mining pool.This is different from the previous work in that the ratio of the number of mining machines in the mining pool to the total number of mining machines in the network is the probability of success in the mining pool;unlike Tsabary's model,we accumulate the accumulated transaction fee of the mining machine to the start of the mining machine,and the transaction fee for the lucky mining machine to be opened will be as the basic reward of the next block;On this basis,the dynamic gap mining model is proposed,and some conclusions are drawn through iterative experiments.1)Through the analysis of the new static model experiment,it is concluded that for the mine pools with earlier start-up,the transaction fee accumulated in the later stage will not be very high,so the income of the mining pool will be lower.2)According to the experiment of the dynamic game model,when the operating cost is too low,there will be an excessive number of players investing in mining machines,which makes the number of actual operating mining machines in the later bitcoin network decrease sharply,which is not conducive to the safety of the bitcoin network.