Regulation Capture And Media Supervision In Environmental Pollution Control

Environmental issues are related to people’s health and living standards.Since the 18 th National Party Congress,environmental governance has been highly valued.However,the situation of frequent environmental incidents has not been alleviated.The carbon nine leakage incident in Fujian Quangang and the serious environmental pollution incidents in the Shanxi Three-Dimensional Group have also touched the hearts of the people,and have also exposed the reality that the local environmental supervision departments have low environmental regulation efficiency.The local environmental supervision department’s regulatory measures are bound by its own performance goals and economic development goals.These factors form the administrative burden of local governments,thus restricting the choice of local environmental law enforcement agencies’ regulatory strategies.Due to the large administrative burden,local environmental supervision departments are often captured by regulations,and their regulatory objectives are deviated from the public interest objectives.Therefore,this paper starts with the local government’s regulatory capture,analyzes the impact of administrative burden on the regulatory intensity of local environmental supervision departments and the choice of law enforcement methods,and explains the impact of the introduction of media governance on the decision-making of polluting enterprises and local environmental regulatory authorities.This paper introduces the theory of regulation capture and media governance into the analysis of environmental regulation,constructs a game model of polluting enterprises and local environmental supervision departments,analyzes the new perspectives and methods in related fields,and improves the efficiency of environmental supervision and solves the local environment.The regulatory dilemma has certain practical significance.This paper firstly studies the research status of environmental regulation research,regulation capture theory and media governance theory through literature research,and summarizes the research results of existing literature and the possibility of further research.At the same time,it sorts out the current situation of environmental pollution control in China and analyzes the practical problems existing in China’s environmental regulation.On this basis,this paper combines the theory of regulatory capture to construct a game model between polluting enterprises and local environmental law enforcement departments,and conduct a theoretical analysis of local environmental law enforcement agencies due to administrative burdens resulting in regulatory capture.Subsequently,through the regression of Pooled OLS,this paper studies the relationship between the law enforcement intensity of local environmental law enforcement departments and the administrative burden,and conducts a test of the robustness of the empirical results.On this basis,this paper introduces media supervision into the game model,and analyzes the impact on the decision-making of polluting enterprises and local environmental supervision departments and their influence paths when there is strong media supervision.The research shows that:(1)The large administrative burden will lead to the capture of local environmental supervision departments,which is an important reason for the lack of local environmental supervision.Local environmental law enforcement departments often have to adopt a laissez-faire attitude towards corporate environmental violations because of local economic and taxation factors.The empirical results show that there is a significant negative correlation between the proportion of polluting industries in regional industrial output and fiscal revenue and the intensity of law enforcement by local environmental regulatory authorities.(2)When the supervision technology is low,it is often difficult for local environmental law enforcement departments to identify the illegal activities of the enterprise.At this time,strict supervision is contrary to the economic objectives of the local government environmental supervision department,resulting in local environmental supervision departments often adopting law enforcement by camera.the way.With the improvement of regulatory technology,strict supervision will better meet the objectives of local environmental supervision departments,and will promote local governments to move toward strict enforcement.(3)However,when local environmental law enforcement agencies cause regulatory capture due to administrative burdens,simply improving regulatory techniques is often difficult to compensate for government regulatory loopholes.(4)The empirical results show that once the environmental violations of the enterprise are exposed by the media,the enterprise will face the current economic loss from the market,which means that in the case of media supervision,the cost of corporate environmental violations will be pushed up,which will give the polluting enterprises a shock.The role of making it change its production and sewage strategy.(5)The exposure of the media to environmental pollution incidents in the jurisdictions often attracts public concern and direct intervention by relevant departments of the central government,thereby reducing the administrative burden of local environmental law enforcement agencies and increasing the probability of direct government intervention and severe crackdown.On the basis of the research conclusions,this paper believes that the evaluation mechanism of local governments and their principal officials should be transformed to ensure the independence of the judiciary and reduce the policy burden of local governments.At the same time,the vertical supervision system of environmental governance should be strengthened to ensure the independence of environmental law enforcement.In addition,environmental supervision should make full use of media supervision and give full play to the role of mass media in environmental governance.