Research On Emission Reduction Optimization And Collaborative Contract Of Shipping Supply Chain Based On Different Emission Reduction Incentive Policies

In recent years,global warming has become one of the world’s major crises and greenhouse gas emission reduction has also become a major international concern.As shipping emissions are one of the important sources of greenhouse gas emissions,the reduction of shipping emissions is urgent,which also poses new challenges to the shipping industry in the new era.Therefore,improving the efficiency of reducing emissions in the shipping supply chain,increasing the profits of nodes in the shipping supply chain,and reducing the overall cost of reducing emissions in the shipping supply chain have become the objects of focus for scholars in the new era.However,the current research on shipping emission reduction is mostly based on shipping emission reduction policies or shipping emission reduction technologies,and there are relatively few literatures on shipping emission reduction efficiency from the perspective of shipping supply chain.Therefore,based on different emission reduction incentive policies,this paper takes the secondary supply chain composed of liner transportation companies and freight forwarding companies as the research object to study the emission reduction efforts of the shipping supply chain and contract coordination issues,thereby improving the efficiency of shipping emission reduction and achieving shipping supply.Chain sustainable development.The study draws the following new conclusions:Based on the modeling methods of different emission reduction incentive policies,two types of emission reduction optimization decision models for liner shipping company unit emission incentives and total emission incentives were constructed,and the impact mechanisms of the two emission reduction incentive policies were analyzed through comparative research.Research shows that under the two emission reduction incentive policies,there is only one optimal equilibrium strategy for the optimized decision-making model of liner transportation companies;compared with the unit emission reduction incentive policies,liner transportation companies have greater The driving force for reducing emissions;however,the relative size of the maximum profit of liner shipping companies under the two emission reduction incentive policies is related to environmental parameters.The numerical example further shows that when the total emission limit isrelatively large,the total emission incentive policy is compatible with incentives,which can not only make the liner transportation enterprises get more profits,but also meet the management of the management department to reduce emissions as much as possible purpose.Based on the modeling methods of different emission reduction incentive policies,two emission reduction optimization decision-making models of unit emission incentives and total emission incentives under the wholesale price-proportion pricing contract were constructed,and the contracts under the two emission reduction incentive policies were studied through comparative analysis Synergy.Research shows that given a wholesale price-proportional pricing contract,there is a single optimal carbon emission reduction rate for the liner shipping company to obtain maximum profits;at the same time,given a proportional plus factor,there is a single optimal wholesale price Freight forwarding companies get the most profit.Research on numerical examples shows that given a wholesale price-proportional pricing contract,liner shipping companies have reduced the carbon reduction rate,the supply chain system revenue has not reached the supply chain revenue in the context of centralized decision-making,and the wholesale price-proportional pricing contract The two-stage supply chain achieves synergy;and the comparison of the two emission reduction incentive policies shows that in the same market environment,given a wholesale price-proportional pricing contract,unit emission incentive policies are always better than total emission incentive policies.Based on different emission reduction incentive policy modeling methods,the collaborative mechanism of revenue sharing contract and revenue and cost sharing contract is studied.The research shows that under the unit emission incentive policy and the total emission incentive policy,the revenue sharing contract can achieve supply chain coordination;but because the freight forwarding company fails to obtain positive revenue,the supply chain coordination revenue is all attributed to the liner transportation company,so,Freight forwarding companies lack economic incentives to implement revenue sharing contracts.The study further shows that freight agency companies implementing revenue and cost sharing contracts can not only achieve supply chain coordination,but also distribute profits arbitrarily between liner shipping companies and freight agency companies accordingto the sharing ratio.Therefore,for the two-stage shipping supply chain that considers emission reduction efforts,the revenue and cost sharing contract is a better supply chain coordination mechanism.Both liner shipping companies and freight forwarding companies have economic incentives to implement this collaborative contract.