Study On The Economic Consequences Of Pledge Of Controlling Shareholder’s Equity Of KangDeXin

In recent years,the phenomenon of stock pledge of controlling shareholders of listed companies has become more and more common,which has attracted wide attention from academia and the public.As an emerging financing channel,equity pledge is popular with many major shareholders of listed companies due to its characteristics of easy realization and easy operation.As a new financing method,equity pledge has the advantages of easy realization and easy operation,but its disadvantages and risks have gradually begun to attract people’s attention.On the one hand,equity pledge actually transfers the stock risk to the pledgee,which may become a means for major shareholders to empty the listed company and reduce the value of the company.On the other hand,equity pledge may lead to the transfer of control rights of major shareholders and affect the stability of the company.This paper will adopt the method of case analysis,take kangdexin as the case company,take the crisis of equity pledge as the starting point,study the behavior of equity pledge of major shareholders of listed companies in China,and further discuss the related problems of equity pledge.Through combing the literature,this paper mainly analyzes the motivation of major shareholders’ equity pledge and the possibleeconomic consequences of the company’s equity pledge from two perspectives.Through the study of this paper,it is of great significance to improve the theory of equity pledge in China,to deepen investors’ understanding of the utility of equity pledge,and to prevent the risks of equity pledge of major shareholders.At the same time,it is hoped that it can provide reference basis for improving the internal governance of Chinese companies,strengthening the external supervision of listed companies,and standardizing the law of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge,so as to more effectively restrain controlling shareholders’ equity pledge.