Research On The Relationship Between Chinese-style Fiscal Decentralization And The Efficiency Of Local Government Environmental Protection Expenditure

Since the reform and opening up,China’s decentralization system is mainly reflected in the high degree of political centralization and a moderate economic decentralization.Under the special system background of China,many scholars have made in-depth analysis of the impact of fiscal decentralization.The starting point of fiscal decentralization theory is the study of public service supply.Environmental protection is one of the public services provided by the government.The efficiency of government expenditure on environmental protection has an important impact on the long-term development of the country and the improvement of people’s living standards.The Chinese government set up a special environmental protection expenditure subject in 2007.In the context of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization,it is particularly important to explore how to improve the efficiency of local government environmental protection expenditure.This paper combines theoretical analysis with empirical analysis.First of all,it reviews the fiscal decentralization theory and efficiency evaluation theory,and uses the fiscal decentralization theory to analyze the mechanism of fiscal decentralization on the efficiency of local government environmental protection expenditure.Secondly,based on the practice of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization,five indicators were selected from the three dimensions of income decentralization,expenditure decentralization,and management decentralization.The weighted method is used to measure Chinesestyle fiscal decentralization.Then,taking the local government’s environmental protection expenditure as the input index,the total amount of wastewater discharge,The amount of sulfur dioxide emissions,the amount of industrial solid waste,the amount of urban domestic waste collection and transportation,and the per capita park green area as the output variables.The DEA model is used to calculate the efficiency of local government environmental protection expenditure.Finally,based on theoretical analysis,an empirical model is constructed to analyze the relationship between Chinese-style decentralization and the efficiency of local government environmental protection expenditure.Through calculation and empirical analysis,we can draw the following conclusions: First,the absolute level of fiscal decentralization in China’s provinces is relatively low,and the overall level of fiscal decentralization changes relatively slowly.There is a significant difference in the degree of fiscal decentralization between the three regions.Second,there are generally inefficiencies in the environmental protection expenditure of local governments in China.There are significant differences between regions and individuals.The environmental protection expenditure efficiency in the eastern region is significantly higher than in the central and western regions.Third,there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between provincial fiscal decentralization and the efficiency of local government environmental protection expenditure.Moderate fiscal decentralization can promote the efficiency of local government environmental protection expenditure,and excessive decentralization will cause efficiency degradation.Local government competition will distort government behavior and inhibit the efficiency of environmental protection expenditure.The level of regional education,urbanization,and the degree of opening up will all have a positive incentive effect on the efficiency of local government environmental protection expenditure.Based on the above research conclusions,this article puts forward relevant policy recommendations: First,improve China’s fiscal decentralization system,and clarify the division of power and expenditure responsibilities of environmental governance between central and local governments;second,reform the incentive and assessment mechanism of local governments;third,improve residents’ participation in environmental protection;the fourth is to establish a steadily increasing mechanism of environmental protection expenditure;the fifth is to improve the supervision and evaluation mechanism of local government’s environmental protection fiscal expenditure.