Research On The Governance Mechanism Of Military-civilian Integration Innovation Reputation From The Perspective Of Utility Theory

China's military-civilian integration strategy has achieved remarkable results and experience in recent years.It is an important way to give full play to the knowledge of military-civilian enterprises and improve their scientific and technological innovation capabilities.With the government's attention and the participation of all parties,China's military-civilian integration and collaborative innovation still have difficulties in cooperation.In this context,this paper focuses on the basic issues in the collaborative innovation of military-civilian integration.Based on the strategic management theory,the utility theory is used to convert the interests of the subject in alliance into the main body's utility,and the research is carried out using evolutionary game theory and simulation methods.Thus,from a new theoretical perspective,the objective law behind the military-civilian integration collaborative innovation mechanism is revealed.First,it established a dynamic game analysis model from the perspective of utility.The evolutionary game theory is used to study the cooperation mechanism between military and civilian enterprises.It analyzes the impact of factors such as national defense benefits,economic benefits,knowledge benefits,and talent returns on the choice of strategy for the subject of military-civilian integration collaborative innovation under different conditions.It is concluded that:(1)When the total income of the civil-military integration innovation is higher than the liquidated damages,with the increase of different benefits,the subject of civil-military integration innovation is more inclined to adhere to the cooperation strategy;(2)When the total income of the civil-military integration innovation is lower than the liquidated damages,with the increase of output,the subjects of military-civilian integration innovation are more inclined to exit the strategy halfway;(3)The symmetry of trust,the cost of coordination,and the strategic obstacles are inversely related to the probability of the military-civilian integration choosing to adhere to the cooperative strategy;(4)The liquidated damages are positively related to the probability of the military-civilian integration choosing to adhere to the cooperative strategyThen,it introduced the reputation mechanism into the military-civilian integration innovation model from the perspective of utility,and a long-term mechanism of collaborative innovation based on reputation is established.Under the reputation mechanism,the effects of national defense efficiency,economic efficiency,knowledge efficiency and talent income on the strategic choice of military-civilian integration and collaborative innovation are analyzed.It is included that:(1)Under the reputation mechanism,when the innovation subject reaches the balance of interests of all parties,it will continue to pursue the respective interests of the subject,and the military-civilian integration innovation subject is more inclined to exit the strategy halfway;(2)Under the reputation mechanism,the symmetry of trust,the cost of coordination,and the strategic obstacles are inversely related to the probability of the military-civilian integration choosing to adhere to the cooperative strategy.Last,it summarized the main reasons for the problems of military-civilian integration collaborative innovation and puts forward suggestions from the government aspect and the enterprise aspect.It provides countermeasures and suggestions on how to improve the military-civilian integration collaborative innovation,which enriches the content of it.