'Because': An explanation of the pragmatics involved in understanding 'because'

In this paper I discuss the meaning of 'because.' In the first chapter, I agree with the contemporary logic texts which claim that 'because' is similar to 'therefore' in that they both may indicate either an argument or an explanation. I address the conflict between the account of argument and explanation given by the contemporary logic texts, Hempel, and Ryle. In the second chapter, I modify Steven Rieber's pragmatic account of 'therefore,' and apply it to 'because' to explain how 'because' indicates arguments and explanations. My modified-Rieberian theory of 'because' claims that 'because' carries a conventional implicature, a tacit performative, which suggests that a statement may be either an explanation or an argument, and which warns the audience that there may be missing assumed explanans or premises. Finally, in the third chapter, I demonstrate how my modified-Rieberian theory of 'because' complements Bas Van Fraassen's pragmatic theory of explanation.