An analysis of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) football enforcement actions from 1990 to 2011

This paper serves to update previous research conducted analyzing the cartel behavior of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). A cartel agreement in which the Association attempts to maximize profits for its members by regulating input prices and restricting output has evolved throughout the NCAA's existence. A cartel maintains its feasibility only when the expected costs of violating the cartel agreement remain greater than expected benefits of violation. Using data from 1950 to the 1980's, previous research found the NCAA relied upon observable variables like winning percentage variability to detect violations of cartel regulations. This results in a redistributive effect that has benefited consistent winners while placing teams who experience rapid increased achievement at a disadvantage. Drastic changes have occurred on the college sport landscape recently; this study provides a much needed update to previous research by contemporizing the data corresponding to previously studied variables.