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A study of the Chinese decision to intervene in the Korean War

Posted on:1990-01-01Degree:Ph.DType:Thesis
University:Columbia UniversityCandidate:Huo, Hwei-lingFull Text:PDF
GTID:2475390017454539Subject:International Law
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
On October 16, 1950, China intervened in the Korean War. At that time, the new-born Chinese Communist regime was beset with domestic problems, and Washington still entertained hopes that a conflict of interests would arise between Beijing and Moscow in the near future. Later on, it turned out that China's intervention in the Korean War had serious consequences with respect to Sino-American relations and Cold War politics. Why did China decide to intervene in the Korean War in October 1950? This is the thesis of the present study, which relies heavily on Chinese data to examine and analyze the questions under investigation.;The findings of this study suggest that certain concepts in American political science literature on deterrence, decision-making, the use of force, and conflict behavior are useful in explaining China's decision to intervene in the Korean War.;Chapter 1 presents a general introduction to the study: subject, research questions, data base, etc. Chapter 2 discusses China's role in planning North Korea's attack upon South Korea on June 25, 1950. This study finds that China did not play a positive role in planning this event, which suggests that China's later intervention in the war was not an initiatory action, and that more questions require examination and analysis. The succeeding three chapters discuss possible correlations between the Soviet influence, Chinese decision-makers' perceptions, the failure of Chinese deterrence and China's Korean War decision. This study concludes that, in making China's Korean War decision, while the Soviet influence was only a contributing factor, Chinese leaders' perceptions and the failure of Chinese deterrence were the determining factors. Among the two determining factors, the former was the underlying cause and the latter, the immediate cause. The appraisal of this study also extends to Beijing's crisis decision-making in 1950. This study finds that Beijing's Korean War decision-making was characterized by hesitation and indecision, policy differences and debates, and "bureaucratic politics.".
Keywords/Search Tags:Korean war, Chinese, Decision, Intervene
PDF Full Text Request
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